Initiatives by President Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) have created positive dynamics in cross-strait relations that are advantageous to Taiwan and are supported by many of Taiwan’s friends in the US. But the new situation has also influenced US decision-making on the Ma government’s request for 66 US F-16 jet fighters, effectively blocking the transfer of those planes or other advanced fighters.
Taiwan and China are maneuvering for advantage in the improved cross-strait atmosphere. Economic and social contacts will advance with the visit of Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait (ARATS) Chairman Chen Yunlin (陳雲林) to Taiwan.
However, uncertainty clouds the efforts to get China to ease diplomatic isolation and military intimidation of Taiwan. Chinese officials don’t move on these areas because they are suspicious of Ma’s willingness to consider reunification and his defense plans that include advanced weapons, notably F-16 fighters, from the US.
Debate rages in Taiwan and is also clearly evident in Beijing. The opposition in Taiwan warns of dire consequences for Taiwan’s sovereignty and security.
They have mobilized mass demonstrations, while extremists have compromised Chen’s visit by assaulting his deputy during a visit to Tainan last month. Some Chinese officials and opinion leaders have emphasized the “strategic opportunity” of thawing cross-strait relations, but others continue to stress their reservations and suspicions.
The administration of US President George W. Bush welcomed improvements in cross-strait relations and tailored US policy in ways that facilitated further progress.
Aware that the most prominent instrument of US policy toward Taiwan since the break of official relations in 1979 is US arms sales, the Bush government in its waning days formally notified Congress of a US$6 billion package of arms that notably did not include the requested F-16 fighters.
The Bush administration came into office with a strong determination to deter China’s military pressure on Taiwan, in part by providing it with an array of advanced weapons.
A major US offer of weapons was held up for years by Taiwan’s reluctance to pay and by partisan bickering in the Legislative Yuan. As the Bush government’s relations with former president Chen Shui-bian deteriorated because of Chen’s pro-independence stance — seen as provocative by China and the US — the US seemed reluctant to go forward with arms sales that would appear to support the controversial Taiwanese leader.
Ma has carefully avoided pro-independence positions, sought forward movement with China and developed coherent military plans designed to preclude war in the Taiwan Strait. In response, the US was inclined to support the Ma government’s requests for arms.
However, egregious US arms sales could upset the emerging positive dynamic in cross-strait relations. In the end, the Bush government offered a large arms package, but without the F-16s.
The move was strongly criticized as inadequate by some Taiwan supporters in the US and it met with firm and measured Chinese denunciation and retaliation through the cancellation of military and other contacts.
The US presidential candidates welcomed the arms package, with the office of Republican Senator John McCain showing stronger support than that of Democratic Senator Barack Obama for the F-16 sales to Taiwan.
To longtime observers of US arms sales to Taiwan, the US debate on whether or not to sell F-16 fighters to Taipei seems increasingly academic. The opportunity to sell such high-profile weapons without major consequences for US relations with China comes infrequently.
Like his father, former US president George H.W. Bush, who transferred 150 F-16 fighters to Taiwan at the end of his administration in 1992, President Bush built a positive and personal relationship with Chinese leaders that would presumably withstand the negative fallout from China in reaction to such high-profile jet fighter sales.
The incoming administration, whether headed by Obama or McCain, will take time — probably years — to build such a relationship with Beijing.
The past record shows that Chinese officials — in the interim — will be extremely sensitive to policies of the new US government toward Taiwan and will react very strongly to US arms sales or other initiatives.
Of course, the new US government may decide to move ahead with F-16 sales anyway, but the resulting uproar in China-US relations is probably the last thing an Obama or McCain administration would seek in the midst of enormous US problems at home and abroad that require extensive cooperation with China.
Meanwhile, defense specialists in Washington say that the US ability to provide F-16s to Taiwan or any other country is scheduled to end within a year as a result of the closing of the aircraft’s production line.
Looking out, conceivable options for the US to provide advanced fighters to Taiwan seem very limited.
Providing Taiwan with US fighters more advanced that the F-16s would risk such strident Chinese reaction that even tough-minded US policymakers determined to deter Chinese military intimidation of Taiwan are likely to eschew the choice.
They are more likely to make a virtue out of a necessity and support the so-called “porcupine” strategy for Taiwan’s defense that emphasizes measures Taiwan can take for self-defense that preclude use of advanced aircraft to take the battle to the invading enemy across the Strait.
Robert Sutter is a professor of the School of Foreign Service in Georgetown University.
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