Law of the sea = ELE?
Dear Johnny,
I am writing a line or two to ask you about something that caught my attention a while ago.
I include one source for you, a Guardian article by Owen Boycott in your newspaper entitled “Murky designs on treasures of the final frontier” (Dec. 8, 2007, page 9).
The subhead reads: “Nations are lining up to claim vast tracts of the seabed for oil, gas and mineral deposits. But international conflict and ecological disasters could be the result.”
Of all the possible implications, one stood out in my mind. How would Taiwan’s exclusion from the UN affect its future in this regard?
China would certainly lay claim to Taiwan and its territory under the final and binding UN deadline of May 13, 2009, the final date for submissions under a UN drive to set the outer limits of seabed rights.
Try searching “UN Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf” and “1982 Law of the Sea Convention.” Then ask this: How would Taiwan under the present conditions be able to assert any claim without UN representation?
When I did a search on this issue, I read about mad scrambles made by various countries laying claims to their respective pieces of the pie.
Russia is bobbing around and planting flags underneath the Arctic, but other than throwing water bottles at the Japanese coast guard, what is Taiwan doing, or what can Taiwan do, to protect its sovereignty? (Or is that the sovereignty of the Republic of China … another confusing subject altogether.)
It is my understanding that after the May 2009 deadline a final and binding map of international seabed boundaries will be drawn and all disputes finalized. How will this influence Taiwan and its future?
Taiwan is not represented at the UN and therefore cannot officially lay a claim to its own territorial waters. But I’m sure that China will.
Will that be the final day for the dream of an independent Taiwan? I might be reading too far into this, but perhaps this is a factor in the freeze of weapons sales to Taiwan?
Why is this issue — an “extinction-level event” (ELE) for Taiwan, as it were — not being reported in Taiwan and flying under the radar everywhere else?
RIAAN VAN HEERDEN
Johnny replies: I don’t think that the arms freeze has anything to do with this issue, Riaan. But overall you raise an excellent point in your letter.
I am no lawyer, and certainly have no expertise in maritime disputes. But I am informed enough to guess that any global deal on seabed divisions will have to set aside room for unresolvable disputes, not just here in the Taiwan Strait and over the Diaoyutai (釣魚台), Spratly and Pratas island groups, but also in waters separating countries all around the world. Japan and South Korea have a similar dispute, as do states in Central America; even the US has several maritime border disputes with Canada, for heaven’s sake.
The key issue here, as you say, is whether the deal, if it is reached, further excludes Taiwan from the backroom deals that affect our security. I suspect that there is a real danger here, and it will be an interesting test of President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) mettle if he is forced to step up to the plate and oppose a comprehensive Chinese sea grab. That is to say, don’t hold your breath.
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