The US is a “resident” power in Asia that has been and will remain fully engaged in the region, supportive of and involved in the development of any regional security architecture: This was the central message delivered by US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore over the weekend.
Press coverage has focused on his “subtle warnings” to China and blunt comments about Myanmar, but the real message was one of reassurance of continued US commitment to the region.
This was demonstrated by Gates’ three main points: The US is “a Pacific nation with an enduring role in Asia”; it stands “for openness, against exclusivity”; and the future policy of any new US administration will be “grounded in the fact that the United States remains a nation with strong and enduring interests in the region.”
As one would expect, Gates pointed to Washington’s five alliances — with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Thailand — as “the foundation of our security presence,” adding that they were “enabled and strengthened by our relationships with partners and friends.”
He said the US military presence in the region as a sign of continued commitment and the ability “to respond quickly to a number of contingencies.”
Unlike the speeches of his predecessor, Gates barely mentioned China by name during his presentation and when he did, it was generally in complimentary or sympathetic terms. He praised Beijing’s “valued cooperation” on North Korean denuclearization and noted the increased level of engagement between the two militaries, while extending condolences over the tragic loss of life during the Sichuan earthquake.
More obliquely — but with China clearly in mind — he acknowledged regional worries about rising demand for resources and “coercive diplomacy” and called for “more military openness in military modernization in Asia.”
When he cited the advanced notification and open manner in which the US shot down a defunct satellite in February as an example of US military transparency, the comparison with China’s anti-satellite test last year was obvious, even if left unsaid.
Lieutenant General Ma Xiaotian (馬嘯天), deputy chief of staff of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), was less subtle. He did not mention the US (other than including Hurricane Katrina in the list of recent natural disasters), but did identify “expansion of military alliance” and “development and expansion of missile defense system” among the major security challenges the region still faces.
While Gates saw alliances as a positive factor, Ma saw them as “ensuring security of some countries at the expense of others.” Questions from the floor asking for clarification on this point were left unanswered. Missile defense, Ma said, was “not helpful in strategic balance,” although he failed to explain why the massive build-up of offensive missiles opposite Taiwan was any less helpful.
Nonetheless, Ma’s central message was also one of reassurance: “China is a peace-loving country” that would always adopt “a defensive defense policy,” would not engage in an arms race, would never seek hegemony or expansion, and would be a “military threat to no other country.”
He also spoke of “positive developments” and “good momentum” in the cross-strait situation, but added that “the mission of opposing and curbing secessionist activities remains strenuous.”
Ma shared the podium with Japanese Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru who, along with Ma, underscored improvement in Sino-Japanese relations. Ishiba called on Beijing to increase its military transparency but said that “Japan does not subscribe to purposely overstating China as a threat.”
The toughest questions from the floor were directed toward — and largely unanswered or evaded by — Myanmar’s Deputy Minister of Defense Mgen Aye Myint, who wanted the audience to believe that Typhoon Nargis rescue and recovery operations were proceeding smoothly, while assuring his colleagues that all outside aid was welcome “as long as there were no strings attached.”
It was refreshing to hear an ASEAN senior statesman press his Burmese colleague on the issue of “responsibility to protect,” even if there was no follow-through. The genuine sense of embarrassment in ASEAN over Myanmar’s actions in the wake of the natural disaster was obvious. But whether this takes the form of policy-related actions or decisions remains to be seen.
The one thing that virtually all present, including Gates, seemed to agree on was that there would be no forced distribution of aid.
The toughest response to a question came from Gates. In his prepared remarks, he had been factual and largely neutral in discussing Myanmar, merely noting the US’ willingness to help, despite obstructions, and welcoming ASEAN’s leadership in searching for a mechanism to help get aid to those most in need.
When asked by a former Singaporean diplomat why Washington was not prepared to change its “failed policy of isolationism” against Myanmar, however, Gates forcefully said: “We have reached out; they have kept their hands in their pockets,” adding that to date ASEAN’s engagement policy likewise seems to have had “zero influence” on Myanmar. The problem here is not Washington’s — or ASEAN’s — policies; it’s the ruling junta in Myanmar.
Unlike speeches by his predecessors at earlier Shangri-La Dialogues, Gates mostly avoided talking about the Middle East or global issues in general, other than to acknowledge regional concerns that actions in Iraq and Afghanistan were distracting US attention from Asia, a notion he hoped his speech would serve to disabuse. Refreshingly, nowhere in Gates’ speech was there any reference to the global war on terrorism, indicating that the Pentagon has gotten the message that Washington’s constant hectoring on this topic is counterproductive and sends the wrong message about US priorities in Asia.
What defense establishments in Asia wanted and needed to hear was the reassurance that, despite commitments and distractions elsewhere, Washington remained aware of the region’s growing importance and would remain engaged, regardless of who the next US president might be.
Ralph Cossa is president of the Pacific Forum CSIS, a Honolulu-based nonprofit research institute affiliated with the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.
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