Former minister of justice Wang Ching-feng’s (王清峰) statement that she would never authorize the execution of a prisoner on death row and her subsequent resignation caused quite a controversy. Suddenly, everyone seems to be an expert on capital punishment, while both Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) politicians have showen serious confusion over the issue. This shows that neither the government nor the opposition have been practising what they have been preaching for so many years.
Ever since Chen Ding-nan (陳定南) became justice minister when the DPP administration took office in 2000, the party has closely followed the spirit of international treaties by declaring the death penalty should be abolished and by placing a moratorium on death sentences. However, over the past few days, statements by DPP Chairperson Tsai Ying-wen (蔡英文) and other DPP politicians imply they have forgotten that it was their party that initiated the move to incorporate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights into Taiwanese legislation when the party was in power.
In so doing, they have rejected the party’s policy to abolish capital punishment and looked toward China, the country with the highest number of executions. The DPP, which followed up on its loss of government power by pledging to consolidate democracy and human rights values while further insisting on not leaning toward China, is obligated to tell the public whether its position on this issue has changed as a result of short-term political interests, or if it has instead decided to “actively lean toward China” on human rights issues.
While still in opposition, the KMT was strongly opposed to incorporating the two covenants into law, but as soon as President Ma Ying-jeou’s (馬英九) administration came to power, it claimed the integration of the two covenants in local legislation as its own accomplishments. The government is now duty-bound to explain why it will not tell the public that Article 6, paragraph 4 of the ICCPR stipulates that “Anyone sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon or commutation of the sentence.” It should also explain that Article 8 of the Act to Implement the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (公民與政治權利國際公約及經濟社會文化權利國際公約施行法) states: “All laws, regulations, directions and administrative measures incompatible to the two covenants should be amended within two years after the Act enters into force.”
Why avoid the fact that 14 of the 44 convicts now on death row requested a constitutional interpretation two years ago and asked that a moratorium on executions be imposed, that the remaining 30 convicts could very possibly have similar reasons to request a constitutional interpretation and that the Ministry of Justice is studying the possibility that their sentences are unconstitutional and whether their cases should be retried?
The Ministry of Justice under KMT and DPP administrations claimed that its decision not to carry out executions had legal foundations. This raises the question: Why is the Ma administration is abusing the phrase “administration according to the law” and refusing to face up to its human rights promises given that there now is domestic legislation giving legally binding force to the two international human rights conventions?
Could it really be that the KMT thinks that taking political responsibility means carrying out illegal executions?
Liu Ching-yi is associate professor of law in the Graduate Institute of National Development at National Taiwan University.
TRANSLATED BY PERRY SVENSSON
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