For Chinese President Hu Jintao (
Then, as now, security forces and Tibetan protesters clashed outside the Jokhang, the holiest Tibetan temple, rioters burned police cars outside the Potala palace and troops surrounded monasteries.
But it is the differences that may be more relevant in understanding why the protests are taking place today and how Hu might respond.
In 1989 the eyes of the world were distracted. It was a year of protest in which the Berlin Wall fell and the Tiananmen Square massacre occurred. The clashes in Tibet were a small part of what seemed -- in the West -- a bigger, global story.
Today the eyes of the world are on China. The Olympic Games are focusing attention on a country whose economic and diplomatic power have made it more important than ever before.
For the Chinese Communist Party, the Games are an opportunity to show its success in lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty. For critics, it is a chance to bring human rights abuses, authoritarian rule and unfair treatment of minorities into the international spotlight.
Tibet is torn, more than anywhere else, by the country's development, which has brought Hu's concept of "scientific development" into one of the most spiritually rich, but materially backward places on Earth. Beijing has pumped tens of billions of yuan into the region, building Tibet's first railway, and other big infrastructure projects, which have helped the region's economy grow by 13.8 percent last year, faster than most other areas of China.
But Tibetan nationalists feel they are losing their identity. The benefits of investment, they say, go mostly to Han Chinese settlers rather than the indigenous population. For them, the railway to Beijing has accelerated the influx of outsiders.
The anger was all too apparent on Friday in the attacks on Han Chinese. Several witnesses reported mobs beating any Chinese they found. At least one Han-owned shop was burned and the windows of many buildings smashed.
It is unclear whether the violence was premeditated, but the timing, coordination and boldness of the initial demonstrations suggested they were more clearly planned than in 1989.
The first protests in Lhasa and other Tibetan communities around the world occurred on the anniversary of the failed 1959 uprising against Chinese rule which forced Tibet's spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama, to flee into exile in India.
"This is a date pregnant with significance for Tibetans," said Matt Whitticase of the Free Tibet Campaign. "Given that the protests started on that date in this particular year, you have to assume that Tibetans picked it to mark the start of protests up to the Olympics."
So who is behind the latest trouble? China has no doubt, blaming the "Dalai clique" for attempting to destabilize the region. The Dalai Lama's spokesman said allegations that he was behind the protests were baseless. But he has so far done nothing to stop the demonstrations, which are growing more intense.
The 72-year-old certainly has the means to stir up protest. After nearly 50 years in exile, he is still venerated in Tibet. Although any sign of support for the Dalai Lama is illegal, locals ask tourists for pictures and some Tibetan temples in Yunnan, Sichuan and Qinghai display his photograph.
His authority was evident last year when Tibetans staged mass "fur-burning" demonstrations after he spoke out against the slaughter of endangered animals for their pelts. China responded by ordering newscasters on local TV to wear fur.
Although his mantra is one of compassion and peace, the Dalai Lama is surrounded by frustration. Five years of talks between his envoys and those of Beijing have made no tangible progress. China says he is a "splittist" with a secret agenda of independence.
Many Tibetan supporters feel the talks are aimed at stringing the Dalai Lama along until he dies, after which Beijing can replace him with a lama of their choosing as they have already done with the Panchen Lama -- the second highest figure in Tibetan Buddhism.
In the past year, there has been a noticeable escalation of verbal hostilities.
Beijing has stepped up its rhetoric, accusing the Dalai Lama of being a feudal, superstitious figure. He has responded with plans for a referendum among Tibetans to choose his reincarnation -- a dramatic change from the usually esoteric process of selection.
Earlier this year, he appeared to go a step further in a television interview, where he said peaceful protest was "worthwhile" in advance of the Olympics. Although aides later said his words were taken out of context, the events of the past week suggest many Tibetans feel otherwise.
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