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Reluctant EU has starring role in Georgia

By Ghia Nodia

Saturday, Jan 05, 2008, Page 9

`Georgia wants a reluctant EU to be more engaged, but each side understands engagement differently.'

Georgia's recent instability has dealt a blow to its international reputation as a new democracy, and poses a challenge to the EU as well. Faced with street protests in November, Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili claimed that Russian-Georgian tycoon Badri Patarkatsishvili was conspiring to bring down the government. So he closed the opposition-leaning Imedi TV station (which Patarkatsishvili owned) and introduced a state of emergency for nine days, before calling an early presidential election for today.

Ever since Saakashvili's inauguration in January 2004, following the 2003 "Rose Revolution," Georgia's government has displayed EU flags on official occasions. Georgians share that enthusiasm. A poll conducted by the International Republican Institute last September indicated that 81 percent of Georgians support joining the EU.But, regardless of the election's outcome, the recent crisis exposes a lack of commitment by the EU to security and democracy in Georgia. Despite Georgia's strategic location on the Black Sea, bordering Russia, Azerbaijan and Turkey -- and on a key trade route linking the EU, Iran, Russia and Central Asia -- Europe has dragged its feet on the country's most enduring political problems.

On the Georgian side, It is well understood -- at least by the political elite -- that EU membership is a distant prospect at best. This weakens the political importance of the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), an initiative developed in 2004 to avoid the emergence of new dividing lines between the enlarged EU and its neighbors. An EU-Georgia ENP Action Plan was signed in November 2006, but it is unlikely to meet expectations.

Indeed, the ENP comes second to cooperation with NATO as a priority for Georgia, in part because Georgians, feeling threatened by Russia, crave security above all. Moreover, while the recent state of emergency was a serious setback, NATO membership, unlike EU accession, is still within reach.

This makes all the difference. The security interests of Georgia and the EU coincide least when it comes to the "frozen conflicts" in the Kremlin-backed breakaway regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia -- it is no accident that "Promoting Peaceful Resolution of Internal Conflicts" ranks only sixth among the ENP Action Plan's priorities.

Georgia wants a reluctant EU to be more engaged, but each side understands engagement differently.The EU supports politically uncontroversial confidence-building measures that can reap results only in the long term, if ever. The Georgian government views the Abkhazian and Ossetian conflicts as the country's principal security threat and impediment to development.

It expects bolder moves from the EU, such as explicit endorsement of the Georgian-Ossetian working group, which includes the alternative, pro-autonomy South Ossetian government of Dmitri Sanakoyev, but is boycotted by the pro-Russian separatist government in Tskhinvali. The EU has avoided any such gesture, seeking to avoid further tension with Russia.

But there are better prospects for strengthening the EU's role in democracy development. "Strengthening the Rule of Law, Building State Institutions, Protecting Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms" occupies first place in the ENP Action Plan. Though judicial independence and protection of human rights remain conspicuously weak, Saakashvili's government has increased the civil service's efficiency, improved public infrastructure, fought corruption, reduced crime and created an attractive investment environment.

However, the opposition's shortcomings pose a further obstacle to democratic development. The government's opponents can mobilize public protests, as in November, but they are much less capable of formulating alternative policy agendas and attracting support for them. With no internal system of checks and balances in Georgia, the international community becomes a compensating actor, with the EU well placed to take the lead.

In fact, while the Saakashvili government's clampdown showed the structural weaknesses of Georgia's democracy, the aftermath has also shown that Georgia's Western ambition remains intact, because the government understands that it cannot afford any long-term deviation from democratic norms.

The EU's special representative in the South Caucasus, Swedish diplomat Peter Semneby, played a crucial role in bringing back Imedi TV in time to restore balance ahead of the presidential election -- possibly the first time the EU took a leading role in seminal political events in Georgia. This was not part of any prefigured Action Plan, but it shows that, given the political will, the EU can play an active role in promoting democracy and stability.

Ghia Nodia is chairman of the Caucasus Institute for Peace, Democracy and Development.

Copyright: Project Syndicate/PASOS
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