Before 2000, Taiwan's top defense strategy against China was "effective deterrence and resolute defense." In case of war, the plan was to "detain the enemy on the opposite shore, fight the enemy at sea, and destroy the enemy if they land." The Taiwan Strait and the coast of Taiwan itself were considered the main battlefield. This was a passive attitude to defense. In the event of conflict, the battlefield would be the Taiwan Strait, and the fight would extend to Taiwan's coast and into the hinterland.
During the presidential elections in 2000, Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) favored the idea of "offshore engagement" as part of defense strategy. He hoped this would ensure that any armed conflict would not ravage the country. At the time, a lot of people laughed: How could Taiwan be powerful enough to engage China "offshore?"
Around 2004, the Southern Taiwan Society invited an expert working in the US to discuss the military situation in Taiwan and China. During the meeting, a member of the society asked if Taiwan had the power to launch a counterattack against China. The expert replied that it did not.
After Chen became president, the budget for the military-run Chungshan Institute of Science and Technology -- which is in charge of weapons research and development -- was immediately increased from NT$7 billion (US$216 million) to NT$9 billion. Information about three new missiles -- the Hsiung Feng III, Hsiung Feng IIE and Tien Kung III -- was released in both national and foreign media. Recently, the US put pressure on Taiwan not to display the Hsiung Feng IIE cruise missile in the military parade on Double Ten National Day, and made it clear it did not want Taiwan to deploy the missile on its outlying islands.
The missile's range is 600km, which means Shanghai, Guangzhou, Hong Kong and the Three Gorges Dam would be within its reach. The Hsiung Feng IIE gives Taiwan the power needed for "offshore engagement." The US, wanting to halt further research by Taiwan that might enable it to build a missile with a range of 1,000km, is now said to be considering selling Tomahawk missiles to Taiwan.
The Hsiung Feng III anti-ship missile has a range of 130km, and perhaps even as much as 300km. It is a more powerful anti-ship weapon than the Sunburn anti-ship missiles that China has bought from Russia. In 2002, Chen ordered that a budget of more than NT$20 billion be allotted to research and development on this advanced weapon. If US and Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) legislators do not create further obstacles, the Hsiung Feng III might serve as a tool for attacking Chinese aircraft carriers.
Between 2001 and last year, Chen has given instructions for the allocation of NT$19 billion to research and development of the Tien Kung III missile. Combined with US-supplied Patriot and Hawk missiles, this has equipped Taiwan with a potent arsenal of anti-aircraft and anti-missile systems. There is also speculation that because its research and development system was joined with that of missiles with a range of 1,000km, the Tien Kung III might become the first of more Taiwanese medium-range missiles.
Chen has done everything in his power to protect research and development of Taiwanese missiles, and offshore engagement capabilities have been realized. It is now one of the considerations that Chinese President Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) points out in his internal directives: If a military conflict broke out in the Taiwan Strait, China's coast could be a seriously affected, halting economic development.
If Chen's missile plans curb Beijing's bellicosity, it will be a blessing for everyone.
Cheng Cheng-iok is the president of the Southern Taiwan Society.
Translated by Anna Stiggelbout
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