Yu Shyi-kun has announced his sudden resignation as chairman of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). This is a serious problem for the DPP, especially at a crucial time ahead of the presidential elections next year.
What Yu insists on are the "core values" of the DPP, and it is also for this reason that his resignation is unlike those of former chairpersons Hsu Hsin-liang (許信良) and Shih Ming-teh (施明德).
Hsu and Shih have turned their backs on the DPP and broken off all relations with the party. Their departure didn't seriously affect the party, but Yu's case is different.
There is a group of green-camp supporters behind him. If Yu leaves the party, a lot of people will leave with him and the DPP might even collapse.
President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) immediately urged Yu not to leave. He called on Yu to at least continue to lead the DPP until after the legislative and presidential elections next year. Chen obviously has a clear understanding of how serious this problem is.
If he doesn't manage to keep Yu in the party, what is to be feared is not a split in the DPP's top leadership, but that the party's supporters may become very disillusioned. It is even possible that they will select new candidates to take part in the elections.
Taiwan Society chairman Wu Shuh-min (吳樹民) has already publicly announced he wants to do this.
Of course there are people who denounce and people who admire Yu for being willing to put his political life on the line. But at least it's clear that the DPP has not lowered itself to become a party of yes-men.
At least there are still people who are willing to stand up to protect the spirit of the DPP, no matter what the personal cost. This is an example of how the green camp hasn't sold its soul for governmental power.
In statements he made about his resignation, Yu pointed out two things.
The first was that he was unhappy with the DPP for not supporting the stipulation in the "normal country" resolution that would change the name of the country to "Taiwan." He said emphatically that this was against the core spirit of the party.
Furthermore he was against DPP presidential candidate Frank Hsieh's (謝長廷) policy of "reconciliation and coexistence," which Yu believed was only to win voters from the middle, abandoning the party's core goals.
The debate about Hsieh is not new. At the time of the primaries, there were already internal debates about Hsieh's ideas of a "constitutional one China" and "two cities under one nation."
Recently Hsieh has reiterated an old issue, picking up the banner of the three direct links. Even Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) presidential candidate Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has mocked Hsieh for following in his footsteps.
Looking back at Hsieh's earlier statement that his and Ma's ideas on economic relations between China and Taiwan were similar, the whole picture is very unsettling.
The "normal country" resolution has an unquestionable validity in and of itself since it returns to the spirit of the Taiwan independence clause, which lies at the core of the DPP's values. But it might be even more suitable to say that the resolution goes against Hsieh's ideology.
From the first draft of the resolution to passing the compromise version by the party's Central Executive Committee, it was clear on all points that the biggest hurdle in the process of making the resolution was Hsieh.
Yu has said that the reason the green supporters have so strongly expressed their support for the resolution was not just to put some pressure on the DPP, it was even more to draw a "green line" for Hsieh for next year's presidential elections.
After the results of the party primaries were announced, Hsieh very impolitely said if someone won, the result showed that their line was correct. If he is the president, won't Hsieh do whatever he wants, even to the detriment of his own party?
Add to that Hsieh's idea of "reconciliation and coexistence," which in effect relies on the blue camp, and it will be almost unavoidable that the green party line will change color.
The green camp can use the new resolution to control Hsieh, so it is anything but useless.
I'll give two other examples.
First, Cheng Cheng-iok (鄭正煜), chairman of the Southern Taiwan Society, recently published an article in the Liberty Times calling Hsieh's wavering on Taiwan sovereignty into question.
He pointed out that the passing of the "normal country" resolution might end the confusion caused by the green camp not trusting Hsieh.
The second example is that in the meeting of the DPP's Central Standing Committee on May 9, Hsieh again said he wanted to withdraw the planned referendum on applying for UN membership under the name "Taiwan."
Chen Chi-sheng (陳繼盛), chairman of the party's arbitration committee, lectured Hsieh, saying that the UN referendum definitely had to be held, and that winning or losing the presidential election depended on it.
He even told Hsieh that if he wouldn't change the national title and rewrite the Constitution as president, the DPP would force him to.
It's crystal clear that the green camp does not trust Hsieh.
If there is trust, then even the regressive "Resolution on Taiwan's Future" will be understood as a strategic retreat.
But a lot of people don't trust Hsieh, and that's why they wanted the change of the national title and the writing of a new constitution included in the new resolution.
DPP supporters have faith that they will win the presidential election, but it remains to be seen if Hsieh has the same faith and if he can inspire trust in the party's supporters.
These are the most important points. The DPP has to win, but to win the party needs to stick to its guns.
If winning the votes of swing voters means losing the votes of the party's fundamental supporters, the DPP is sure to lose.
The DPP and Hsieh should think things through before daring to be so incautious.
Chin Heng-wei is the editor-in-chief of Contemporary Monthly magazine.
Translated by Anna Stiggelbout
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