Relations between China and Latin America and the Caribbean are paradoxical. As bilateral trade increases and diplomatic relations strengthen, a lack of knowledge persists between the two regions, and in some cases tensions are growing. Hardly any major projects between China and Latin America have been initiated by the private, public or academic sectors, and bilateral institutions do not yet reflect the weight of economic dynamics.
There are two aspects to this paradox. First, many Chinese enterprises -- particularly in basic goods sectors such as soy, meat, iron, steel, copper and oil -- have initiated activities in Latin America, either through direct investment or by buying products and/or businesses. To a lesser degree, Latin American enterprises -- such as Gruma, Modelo, Embraer, Marco Polo and Embraco -- have introduced themselves in China.
Even so, Latin America remains a secondary economic and commercial partner for China. Last year, Latin America and the Caribbean accounted for 3.7 percent of China's exports and 4.3 percent of its imports. But bilateral trade has been growing at impressive rates, with Chinese exports and imports up by 24.8 percent and 23.9 percent respectively from 1995 to last year.
For practically all Latin American countries, China is one of the 10 main trade partners with rates of growth well above total trade. Even for those countries that do not have diplomatic relations with China, commerce has been prolific.
Second, China's penetration of the US and EU markets has in many cases displaced Asian and Latin American competitors. In the case of the US, for example, Latin America's share of total imports, at roughly 17 percent, has not grown since 2000.
China represents a strong ideological challenge for the region, particularly for the status quo of economic policy promoted by the majority of multilateral institutions since the 1980s. China would seem to fit the profile of "the worst student who got the best job," with its per capita GDP growing -- under "ideologically erroneous" conditions -- 17.3 times faster than in Latin America from 1980 to 2005.
Contrary to most of Latin America, China's public sector is omnipresent, exercised through direct ownership or control of incentives in the private sectors. Nor has it liberalized labor and product markets, and it maintains strict control over the exchange rate and capital account. Likewise, it develops five-year plans, and in many cases, such as in science and technology, these are plans that exceed 15 years.
Even so, with its cheaper labor force and faster technological growth, China has attained higher export competitiveness than Latin America, several nations of which it has displaced in key sectors since 2000, such as thread and dry goods manufacturing, electronics and furniture. Whereas China exports manufactured products with an increasing level of technological input, Latin America continues to export basic goods with a minimum of added value.
China represents a massive challenge even for countries such as Brazil that have achieved a significant trade surplus. So dividing Latin American states into "winners" and "losers" makes no sense. Aside from importing basic goods, China exports manufactured goods throughout the region.
Latin American countries would thus benefit from an open, non-ideological and critical analysis of development experiences in the past few decades. They also need an effective rapprochement -- going beyond diplomacy -- that implies greater investment in bilateral institutions. Otherwise, relations between China and Latin America will be far from smooth, even as their significance grows.
Enrique Dussel Peters is coordinator of the China/Mexico Studies Center at the National Autonomous University of Mexico. Copyright: Project Syndicate
China has not been a top-tier issue for much of the second Trump administration. Instead, Trump has focused considerable energy on Ukraine, Israel, Iran, and defending America’s borders. At home, Trump has been busy passing an overhaul to America’s tax system, deporting unlawful immigrants, and targeting his political enemies. More recently, he has been consumed by the fallout of a political scandal involving his past relationship with a disgraced sex offender. When the administration has focused on China, there has not been a consistent throughline in its approach or its public statements. This lack of overarching narrative likely reflects a combination
Behind the gloating, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) must be letting out a big sigh of relief. Its powerful party machine saved the day, but it took that much effort just to survive a challenge mounted by a humble group of active citizens, and in areas where the KMT is historically strong. On the other hand, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) must now realize how toxic a brand it has become to many voters. The campaigners’ amateurism is what made them feel valid and authentic, but when the DPP belatedly inserted itself into the campaign, it did more harm than good. The
US President Donald Trump’s alleged request that Taiwanese President William Lai (賴清德) not stop in New York while traveling to three of Taiwan’s diplomatic allies, after his administration also rescheduled a visit to Washington by the minister of national defense, sets an unwise precedent and risks locking the US into a trajectory of either direct conflict with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) or capitulation to it over Taiwan. Taiwanese authorities have said that no plans to request a stopover in the US had been submitted to Washington, but Trump shared a direct call with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平)
Workers’ rights groups on July 17 called on the Ministry of Labor to protect migrant fishers, days after CNN reported what it described as a “pattern of abuse” in Taiwan’s distant-water fishing industry. The report detailed the harrowing account of Indonesian migrant fisher Silwanus Tangkotta, who crushed his fingers in a metal door last year while aboard a Taiwanese fishing vessel. The captain reportedly refused to return to port for medical treatment, as they “hadn’t caught enough fish to justify the trip.” Tangkotta lost two fingers, and was fired and denied compensation upon returning to land. Another former migrant fisher, Adrian Dogdodo