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Editorial: Taiwan and American values

For all of the talk of tension between them, it is perfectly clear that Washington makes demands of the Taiwanese government on the assumption that the two share fundamental interests. Taiwan's resulting burden, as a de facto US ally, involves coming to terms with being treated -- and sometimes spoken to -- like an errant schoolchild.

This patronizing tone can be difficult to tolerate, especially for those among pro-independence forces who suffered for years to create a society that shares the best of American values.

The tone becomes genuinely unbearable, however, when it threatens to have a chilling effect on the Taiwanese who are most sympathetic to the US.

Most Taiwanese are more pragmatic than idealistic, and know how to handle being patronized while getting on with the job. To such people, retaliation is silly if it harms the bottom line.

Unfortunately, as is too often the case, there are those in Taiwanese political and diplomatic circles who place pressure on the Taipei-Washington relationship by not doing their homework on their de facto allies or their sensibilities.

In recent years, it is these people -- not just President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) -- who helped to create an impression among US officials that Taiwanese are troublesome, scattershot in their approach and unreliable in their allegiances.

By the same token, it is clear that the political-academic establishment in Washington does not adequately comprehend the fundamentals of Taiwanese politics. It is as if they assume Taiwan to have the quasi-monolithic features of an autocratic party-state such as China.

Consequently, the lion's share of the blame for military and diplomatic tensions falls on the government and not the hardline legislature that has handicapped it. Rarely are domestic factors such as these given the weight they deserve in accounting for political developments, which is odd considering how little political change there is in cross-strait relations.

It is also becoming abundantly clear, for example, that in the bowels of the US Department of State there are advisers who look upon Taiwanese as collectively responsible -- that is to say, irresponsible -- for the difficulties in the US-China relationship.

At a certain level this is true, because Taiwanese, like Americans, are responsible for the government they elect -- whether they like it or not.

At another level, however, this is misleading because the limitations imposed on Taiwan that compel it to act in ways termed "provocative" by disciples of the "status quo" are not of the Taiwanese public's making. These limitations include not just the predictable tactics of Beijing in international organizations, but also those imposed by the US itself: no formal contact, no displays of steadfast respect and support, no rhetorical benefit of the doubt.

Keeping Washington happy while furthering the interests of Taiwanese self-determination is a perplexing task, but it is one that has proceeded reasonably successfully under the Chen administration, notwithstanding its many failures.

Washington, and the State Department in particular, like to imply that Chen is hurting the Taiwan-US relationship. But if Democratic Progressive Party presidential candidate Frank Hsieh (謝長廷) wins the next election, they will quickly discover that the job description for a leader protecting this democracy from tyrants includes this enduring dilemma: Standing up to China inevitably involves treading on a lot of American toes.

But it is not inevitable that Washington or Americans should perceive these actions as a slight against them. On the contrary: It is an affirmation of the same values that make the US powerful and that sustain its dignity even when its credibility in the international community is at low ebb.
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