North Korea's recent missile tests have highlighted the complexity of political relations in Northeast Asia. The launches have elicited different reactions from each of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea's (DPRK) neighbors. One of the most notable developments has been a subtle shift in China's policy of engagement toward North Korea. The People's Republic of China's (PRC) new assessment of North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's government could be profoundly influential on regional developments and vital to the resolution of the current crisis.
In the month after the missile tests, the Chinese mood toward North Korea has shifted from being rather lenient to moderately distrustful. The PRC's ties with North Korea are more expansive than those of any other nation.
Beginning with its aid to the beleaguered communist state during the Korean war, China has long provided the DPRK with material and diplomatic support. Aside from supplying Kim's regime with enough fuel and food to prevent a state collapse, the PRC has often been the most vocal party calling for restraint when dealing with the rogue state.
While China is undoubtedly wary of its volatile, erratic neighbor, Beijing is more concerned about the stability of the North Korean state than the status of the DPRK's nuclear program. The PRC has not been willing to implement measures that could lead to North Korea's collapse and a massive refugee crisis on China's northeast border.
The Chinese have usually conducted most of their diplomacy with North Korea quietly and from the sidelines. Therefore, North Korea's missile tests represented a slap in the face to Beijing, which had publicly warned Kim not to take such action. Furthermore, following the tests, Chinese President Hu Jintao (
China also joined South Korea in severely criticizing Japan for floating the idea of a pre-emptive military strike. Yet, a little more than a week later, Beijing supported a modified resolution that all but explicitly invoked punitive sanctions.
Furthermore, China has frozen North Korean funds in the Bank of China in Macao and agreed to make it easier for North Korean refugees to seek political asylum in the US.
This slight, but important, diplomatic shift can be seen as Beijing's reassessment of its own influence over Pyongyang. Despite its economic support of the North Korean regime, Beijing seems to have very little sway over military decisions like the missile tests. Chinese diplomats could not persuade North Korea to return to the six-party talks, and according to many reports, were received less than amiably in Pyongyang.
The failure of China's efforts to re-engage North Korea within the six-party framework represents an embarrassment to Chinese officials, who had requested the rest of the world to place its faith in Chinese diplomacy.
North Korean intransigence thus far does not bode well for diplomacy. The DPRK has refused to return to the six-party talks unless the US lifts long-standing sanctions against it. Pyongyang has also prematurely walked out of the inter-Korean talks and refused to discuss its nuclear program with ASEAN member states.
The only interstate dialogue currently being conducted on North Korea, the 10-party talks facilitated by ASEAN, is going on without North Korea's participation. The DPRK has appeared defiant in the face of international pressure. Calling the unanimously passed UN Security Council resolution irresponsible and destabilizing, North Korean officials have resolved to continue developing and testing their weapons systems, and are continuing their boycott of the six-party talks.
North Korea has vowed more missile tests as well as harsher responses to countries that would try to interfere with future launches. DPRK officials have pledged to bolster their "war deterrent" for self-defense, a commonly used euphemism for their nuclear program.
Most intelligence estimates have indicated that another long-range missile launch is not scheduled for the immediate future, but could happen sometime soon. If current trends hold, the PRC might find itself in an increasingly antagonistic relationship with North Korea. Beijing officials have realized that they cannot solely use their economic ties with North Korea to exert their influence. As North Korea becomes more defiant, China will be forced to move closer to the US-Japan camp regarding North Korea.
However, the prospect for any permanent change regarding China's DPRK policy is unlikely. Despite its growing displeasure with Pyongyang, Chinese leaders are conscious of the crisis that awaits it if the situation on the peninsula were to worsen. The PRC will continue to be hesitant to enact measures that would exert serious, destabilizing pressure on the North Korean state.
More importantly, however, for all his saber-rattling, Kim is extremely unlikely to fully alienate his only ally. More decisive action from China is likely to increase the pressure on North Korea and could be the key to reining in the reclusive regime.
Regardless of the consequences the recent missile launches have for the Korean Peninsula, the crisis must serve as a wake-up call to Taiwan. In light of the North Korean missile tests and the potential for security crises in Northeast Asia, Taiwan must reassess its own defense capabilities.
Taiwan's missile defense posture is woefully under-prepared to tackle the threat it faces from the PRC and North Korea. Well within striking range of North Korean missiles as well as hundreds from the PRC, Taiwan currently lies open and vulnerable.
A domestic missile defense posture more in line with that of the US and Japan would better prepare Taiwan for the security landscape of the 21st century. Taiwanese leaders must act on the North Korean crisis and seriously consider updating their missile defense capabilities to better address the threats they face.
Mrinal Menon is a researcher at the Institute for National Policy Research in Taipei.
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