Print

Mail

wiki links

How Washington hedges its bets in East Asia

There is much written these days on US-China relations, but as Chinese President Hu Jintao's (胡錦濤) recent visit to the US shows, no clear policy by either side has surfaced. What one hears these days is that both sides are working to establish a meaningful bilateral relationship in this rapidly changing atmosphere.

The US, however, for a variety of reasons, is "hedging" policies by strengthening its capability to defend its interests in East Asia.

China is also hedging its policies, mainly in terms of gaining sources of oil and strengthening its military.

For its Taiwan policy, it is holding out for a friendlier government in two years time, with the hope of drawing Taiwan closer to China and avoiding the need to implement unification by means of force.

As for Taiwan, this is where the struggle over the cross-strait issue will be determined. Taiwan's domestic problems, however, are making it more a spectator than an active player in the fundamental changes taking place in East Asia.

Within Taiwan, one side of the domestic political forces now looks to China for support, and the other side looks to the US for security. But the vast majority of voters will likely shun a difficult decision and opt for a continuation of the status quo despite continuous efforts by China to weaken that status by its growing military strength, by influencing the international community not to support Taiwan and by its own historical united front activity.

Taiwan is deeply involved in determining its own identity, with too little thought given to the vast change that is going on around it. President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) recent paper in the Wall Street Journal, titled "We Believe in Democracy," is precisely what is needed for Taiwan. If Taiwan wants to be a country, it has to act as a country, involving itself publicly in regional issues, physically if possible, rhetorically if not.

Looking at the political situation in Taiwan today, and what it may like be in two years time, may well frighten outsiders and even some in Taiwan. Both major parties are now engaged in internal struggles to gain consensus on what direction they should take for the future -- without much success.

The tendency at this point seems to be that those in power on both sides are not interested in compromise.

In the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) the struggle between different factions can be seen very clearly. The very nature of the party is open and not very disciplined. Its strongest leader is the president, who dominates policymaking but may not be able to do so in two years time.

In the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) there are strong differences among factions, but the carry-over of discipline from the past is still influential in party policies. The present leader, KMT Chairman Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九), is popular among the voters, but he does not dominate the party's policies.

At the same time Taiwanese voters are clearly tired of the political struggles brought on by almost continuous elections.

For the rest of the administration's tenure, there will be a relentless chain of elections. This is likely to continue to drive voters away from the polling booth, and cause them to scorn politicians generally.

Last year China broadened its laws to legitimize -- in Beijing's view -- using force to absorb Taiwan, and Taiwan's opposition leaders met with the Chinese Communist Party in China. This was the beginning of what could be a much different cross-strait relationship and a possible change in both Taiwanese and US policies. The KMT, which once wanted to destroy the People's Republic of China (PRC), now wants to regain power to draw closer to China, and eventually, inevitably, to become a part of China.

The elections in the next two years time can have only two possible results, a split government as now, or having one party win control of both the Executive and Legislative Yuan.

The former has shown that the laws, including the Constitution, would have to be changed unless the country is to face the same disaster of the last few years. Voters are not likely to accept this.

Pressure for change in that circumstance may not mean a better democracy.

A outright winner of the elections may be even worse. A pro-China fully ruling party would most certainly move to first nail down economic agreements with China, and revive the old or create a new "National Unification Council" and the guidelines that go with it. The reaction against these moves, despite the results of the elections, could generate considerable instability at the least.

A fully ruling pro-independence party, which at this point does not seem likely, would generate at the least the kind of rioting that followed the 2004 presidential election, and inevitably raise tensions with China.

Now that both political sides accept that Taiwanese voters will decide through referenda any change in Taiwan's status, gathering their votes from the bottom up will make campaigning even more intense and difficult.

With all that is happening in East Asia, and with Taiwan's elections in two years' time, what is the US likely to do in managing its policies in the region?

After 1949, the US continued to recognize and support "Free China." This continued even after 1979 while the KMT continued in power, though the US softly encouraged democracy.

From then until 2000, US administrations worked closely with the government -- and therefore the KMT -- supporting democratization, while viewing the new opposition as troublemakers.

Since the DPP gained power, the US has treated the new government as the legitimate rulers of Taiwan, though the majority of those in the US government pertinent to the US-Taiwan relationship have always felt that the cross-strait issue can best be resolved (from the US standpoint) by a suitable agreement between China and Taiwan, realistically meaning a "soft" unification.

With the growth of a China that is so much involved in the world and especially in East Asia, the US must inevitably consider where its interests lie there and worldwide.

It seems it is interested not only in pursuing a good relationship with China, but also in "hedging" this effort by maintaining its security capabilities in the East Asia region.

This hedging may or may not reflect US thinking, but if it should want to, the US would face two problems with Taiwan: A possible ruling party that is seen as not reliable in terms of competence in running the government, or one that is moving toward a close relationship with China.

Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
This story has been viewed 1581 times.