"Is It a Civil War, or Something Else?" was a New York Times headline last month over a series of quotations characterizing the killing in Iraq. In this space, we have examined the Long War, a locution favored at the patient Pentagon, and the related global war on terror, as well as Gulf War II. But the focus of late is becoming narrower, limited to the fighting within Iraq: Some call it sectarian violence or its synonym Sunni-Shiite fighting; others who see it as more political than religious call it an insurgency or an internecine (in-ter-NEE-sin) struggle.
Sectarian is a word long associated with religion that has a nastier connotation than its synonym denominational. The latest Oxford English Dictionary research puts the first use of the term in 1583 in Stephen Batman's Golden Booke of the Leaden Goddess: "A Recapitulation of the Sectarian Gods, by whose Heresies, much harme hath growen, to Gods true Church."
Within Islam, fundamentalist Sunnis consider Shiism to be a heretical sect. In February 2004, a courier was intercepted by Kurds, as he was reportedly carrying a message from the Jordanian terrorist Abu Musab al-Zarqawi to his leader in al-Qaeda, Osama bin Laden. The letter laid out a strategy to inflame Sunnis in Iraq by murdering Shiites and thereby provoking them to counterattack Sunnis.
"If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war," wrote Zarqawi about the Shiites, according to the English translation, "it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger."
As the number of Iraqi civilian deaths mounted in terrorist-fomented fighting between Sunnis and Shiites, sectarian was more frequently used. The New York Times reported that US President George W. Bush's officials were complaining that "the news media's focus on bombings and sectarian violence had given a skewed view of the progress being made in Iraq."
To avoid using the same phrase in successive sentences, an Associated Press dispatch from Dubai last month equated sectarian violence with ethnic clashes. That's not precise; ethnic strife would be predominantly between ethnic groups, like Arabs and Kurds (both mainly professing the Sunni branch of the faith), or between ethnic Persians in Iran and Arabs in Iraq (both Shiite). When the violence is within one religious group, like the Arab Shiites and Arab Sunnis, both Muslim, it is properly called sectarian violence.
In English-language publications overseas, a more general phrase avoids this error. In Baghdad, for example, different ethnic groups as well as religious sects mingle in the same city. Both the Manila Times and the Australian reported that the attack on the Golden Mosque in Samarra triggered "communal fighting" -- that is, within a community, geographically defined.
"When people of different ethnicities, religions or sects fight each other locally and spontaneously, with no organization," says Edward Luttwak, author of The Dictionary of Modern War, "the correct term is communal fighting. When organized groups -- political, ethnic, religious, it doesn't matter -- fight within the recognized borders of a single country, the correct term is civil war, even if there are many groups and no central direction, so long as the groups are pursuing political projects, such as the re-establishment of Sunni supremacy. Otherwise, they would be just criminal gangs."
Here is where political views affect political terminology. President Bush's view is that terrorists from both outside and inside Iraq -- criminal gangs allied with former Iraqi president Saddam loyalists hiding from prosecution -- are seeking unsuccessfully to foment civil war. Because the largest group in Iraq -- roughly three-quarters of the population -- is Arab Muslim, the Zarqawi plan is to use sectarian violence between Arab Shiites and the smaller segment, Arab Sunnis, as the trigger for all-out civil war, with the non-Arab Kurds -- Sunni, but largely secular -- joining in.
Success for Zarqawi -- and a major setback for Us policy -- would be a widening of sectarian violence into civil war. Success for the coalition forces -- and a major setback for the terrorist-insurgent forces -- would be the prevention of that violence from escalating into civil war.
Critics of the Bush policy and opponents of the current elected government in Iraq are using the term civil war to show that the military campaign is in deep trouble. Ayad Allawi, an Iraqi leader who did not fare well in the elections, told the BBC, "If this is not civil war, then God knows what civil war is." The Senate Democratic leader Harry Reid argued that the policy had "left Iraq on the precipice of all-out civil war." The Republican senator Chuck Hagel, often described as "a frequent administration critic," also used a qualifier: "a low-grade civil war."
Contrariwise, US Vice President Cheney said of the terrorists: "What we've seen is a serious effort by them to foment civil war, but I don't think they've been successful." Bush told reporters that "there were some people trying to, obviously, foment sectarian violence. Some have called it a civil war. But it didn't work."
Shibley Telhami of the Brookings Institution shows how the linguistic battle lines are drawn: "`Iraq is now at civil war' means `we have already lost the battle and we should get out now'; `Iraq is now experiencing sectarian violence' means `Iraq's natural propensity is toward civil war, but thank God for the presence of American forces that are preventing it.'"
But Charles Krauthammer, the most powerful conservative-internationalist columnist, had noted in 2004: "There already is a civil war. It is raging before our eyes. Problem is, only one side is fighting it." Recalling this recently in the Washington Post, Krauthammer updated his point: "Does not everyone who wishes us well support the strategy of standing up the Iraqis so we can stand down? And does that not mean getting the Iraqis to fight the civil war themselves?"
War-namers, stand down: What was euphemized after the US Civil War as "the late unpleasantness" will not get a name until it's over.
Taiwan’s higher education system is facing an existential crisis. As the demographic drop-off continues to empty classrooms, universities across the island are locked in a desperate battle for survival, international student recruitment and crucial Ministry of Education funding. To win this battle, institutions have turned to what seems like an objective measure of quality: global university rankings. Unfortunately, this chase is a costly illusion, and taxpayers are footing the bill. In the past few years, the goalposts have shifted from pure research output to “sustainability” and “societal impact,” largely driven by commercial metrics such as the UK-based Times Higher Education (THE) Impact
History might remember 2026, not 2022, as the year artificial intelligence (AI) truly changed everything. ChatGPT’s launch was a product moment. What is happening now is an anthropological moment: AI is no longer merely answering questions. It is now taking initiative and learning from others to get things done, behaving less like software and more like a colleague. The economic consequence is the rise of the one-person company — a structure anticipated in the 2024 book The Choices Amid Great Changes, which I coauthored. The real target of AI is not labor. It is hierarchy. When AI sharply reduces the cost
The inter-Korean relationship, long defined by national division, offers the clearest mirror within East Asia for cross-strait relations. Yet even there, reunification language is breaking down. The South Korean government disclosed on Wednesday last week that North Korea’s constitutional revision in March had deleted references to reunification and added a territorial clause defining its border with South Korea. South Korea is also seriously debating whether national reunification with North Korea is still necessary. On April 27, South Korean President Lee Jae-myung marked the eighth anniversary of the Panmunjom Declaration, the 2018 inter-Korean agreement in which the two Koreas pledged to
I wrote this before US President Donald Trump embarked on his uneventful state visit to China on Thursday. So, I shall confine my observations to the joint US-Philippine military exercise of April 20 through May 8, known collectively as “Balikatan 2026.” This year’s Balikatan was notable for its “firsts.” First, it was conducted primarily with Taiwan in mind, not the Philippines or even the South China Sea. It also showed that in the Pacific, America’s alliance network is still robust. Allies are enthusiastic about America’s renewed leadership in the region. Nine decades ago, in 1936, America had neither military strength