Ever since Deng Xiaoping's (
But the tendency to apply old labels remains strong, so that everyday we hear gross simplifications like the current one that holds that Latin America is now undergoing a powerful leftist wave.
The basis for this idea is that the rise to power of Lula da Silva in Brazil, Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, Nestor Kirchner in Argentina, Tabare Vasquez in Uruguay, and, most recently, Evo Morales in Bolivia and Michelle Bachelet in Chile show a socialist trend. But are all of them old-style leftists? Or do they practice old style populism? Just what is happening in Latin America?
To start, we can rule out Chile from the supposed leftist surge, for it is a country ruled by a centrist coalition of Ricardo Lagos' European-style socialists and the country's historic Christian democrats. That Bachelet comes from socialist roots does not change the nature of her government, which will follow the parameters of its predecessors, and will preside over the most open economy in the region, one integrated into the global market by free-trade agreements that extend from the US to China.
Nor can one argue that Brazil's government under Lula has not been characterized by moderation, following a more orthodox economic policy even than that of its predecessor, one based on fiscal discipline, budget surpluses and an anti-inflationary monetary policy. In contrast to old leftist slogans against repaying foreign debt, Lula's government has hurried to settle all of its IMF obligations in advance.
The rallying call against paying foreign debt, which was ubiquitous in Latin America in the 1980s, was buried when the Argentine government did the same thing, committing one-third of its reserves to pay its debts to the IMF in advance. Even Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz has questioned whether these countries' debt payment measures represent an exaggerated concession to neo-liberal orthodoxy.
Uruguay's government, too, has not deviated from the basic tenets of the policies of the conservative government that preceded it. It maintains the country's improved relations with the IMF, and it has even approved an agreement with the US to guarantee investments.
Even Bolivia's government should not be regarded as a reincarnation of the continent's old populism. Morales' rise to power was inspired by historic discrimination against the indigenous majority, with the coca leaf as an emblem of an ancestral grudge.
Although Morales campaigned on a promise to nationalize mineral resources, this has not happened yet, and, indeed, he now seems to be leaning towards partnerships with big state-owned energy companies, in the manner of Venezuela's Pedevesa or Brazil's Petrobras. Morales might yet turn more radical, but for now he represents a deep, ethnically inspired demand for historic justice, not a hard-left ideology.
None of these governments openly speaks of socialism, much less Marxism. There is no planned collectivist economy, foreign investment is still sought, and in general the rules of liberal democracy still apply. Leaders may still think that "another world is possible," but while they use anti-globalization rhetoric, they pursue serious economic policies, even if more out of resignation than conviction.
What all this means is that Latin America is not shifting left, but settling in the center. Even traditionally leftist parties like Brazil's Partido dos Trabalhadores or Uruguay's Frente Amplio have abandoned old Marxist ideals. Naturally, they declare friendship with Cuban President Fidel Castro and seek his embrace to prevent old comrades from accusing them of betraying their legacy. But they go no further: Castro is fine for photo opportunities, not for policy advice.
Venezuela's Chavez is another story.
His regime revels in all of the historic forms of populism: messianic leadership, anti-US rhetoric, disregard for constitutional forms, drunken spending and state-orchestrated popular mobilization to fill squares and jeer at supposed enemies. Chavez is riding a wave of high oil prices and is determined, with torrential verbosity, to exercise some sort of continental demagogic leadership. But while Chavez-style populism appears to have made some headway in Peru, it is far from succeeding.
In Colombia, everything indicates that President Avaro Uribe -- erroneously labeled a rightist because of his fight against his country's guerrillas -- will be re-elected. Oscar Arias is winning in Costa Rica. In Mexico, the presidency is up for grabs.
In the meantime, Latin America's economies will continue to benefit from the world boom in commodity markets, elections will remain normal and life will go on in the political middle of the road.
Julio Maria Sanguinetti is a former president of Uruguay.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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