I've been speaking of the need to change the US' rules in conducting the relationship with Taiwan since 1990 when democracy began to blossom in Taiwan. In public speeches in the US, and in my reporting, I have talked about the need to adjust the relationship to fit a democratic system.
It took a crisis in 1996 (the missile crisis) to overcome the need for change in the military relationship. The communications with that element of the relationship has continued to grow without any serious objections from China. Will it take another similar crisis before we see that much better communications in our political relationship are essential?
One example of this needed change was the low profile that both the US and Taiwan felt it necessary to maintain in dealing with each other. In 1979 the rules of conduct unilaterally established by the US side, had a Taiwan ruled by an authoritarian government. The Republic of China could accept any rules without harm as there was no challenge from within to oppose it. What a difference the growth of "information technology" and the rise of Taiwan's democracy makes.
There are other examples of the differences that have developed beginning mostly in 1990, but these two factors are very pertinent to establish more effective communications between the US and Taiwan. A low profile in a democracy is untenable in any event, and information these days is very difficult to contain. Politicians in a democracy need a high profile as much as they need food to eat.
All of this is well known, but aside from the progress in the military relationship, the political relationship is still dogged by the albatross of China's sensitive face.
In 2000, when there was a change of government for the first time in Taiwan, the US intervened in helping to establish, or at least soften, the new government's objectives. This was welcomed by the new government out of necessity as it was completely unprepared to govern. At the same time, both the US and Taiwan were very uncertain about any reaction from China. The commitments were agreed to by the new ruling party and its constituency for the same reasons.
By campaign and election time in 2003-2004, the political atmosphere in Taiwan had changed and doubtless both the ruling party's leadership and its constituency now felt it had more confidence in pursuing their objectives.
As the campaign for president proceeded, the ruling party took the initiative in calling for having a referendum and a new constitution, among other things. In Taiwan it proved to be a successful strategy for the campaign, but in terms of the relationship with the US, it brought tension.
The full story on how this developed is still not fully available, but it took some time to settle, and it did hurt the normally close relationship in the process. Communications between the US and Taiwan improved somewhat, but China's albatross remained.
With its second defeat in the presidential election, the opposition in Taiwan also saw it had to be more aggressive if it was ever to regain power.
First was its use of its legislative majority, which to this day has weakened Taiwan in critical elements of governance, and which the administration has not found means of overcoming.
Second, the opposition established formal connections with a Chinese government that remains unwilling to do the same with the elected government on Taiwan. The government was unsure about how to handle it but it further weakened Taiwan's leadership.
What we may be seeing now is another more aggressive strategy by the ruling party. As in most democratic countries, a change in strategy in mid-term by an administration generates accusations of mismanagement by opponents against the leading personalities, while those supporting the change praise the wisdom of the leadership.
Given the unique relationship between the US and Taiwan, and the problems this has brought, we will doubtless have to wait some time before the present differences are clearly understood.
What is already more clearer than ever, however, is that the system of communications between the US and Taiwan must change or both sides will face a far more dangerous future.
President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) and US President George W. Bush to a degree have the same method of leadership -- putting much faith in a few trusted people. That may be understandable, and even necessary. Both also seem to have problems with using and managing the broad range of experts in security and international relations that could help avoid the likely growth of misunderstanding.
Starting with the present system of US-Taiwan relations that began some 27 years ago, the two have had a unique, close and very successful relationship. With the arrival of democracy in Taiwan, it was thought the relationship would be better than ever.
If one were to read the newspapers or watch TV in Taiwan today, one will see or listen to matters there that have changed considerably. That is true even when discussing the US-Taiwan relationship. Still friendly, but now more willing to be frank, as one would expect in a free country. Taiwan is not alone among the many new democracies elsewhere in this regard.
At the same time, US interests face a much different set of problems. One is that despite it's preference to have Taiwan and China resolve their differences directly, inevitably it gets more involved in trying to ease cross-strait tensions. With this, the US will soon be seen more as helping China's efforts in suppressing democratic Taiwan than carrying an albatross on Taiwan's behalf.
Before we get into another crisis, the two sides should develop routine periodic meetings of senior policy officials to discuss concerns and opportunities.
It is in the US' interest, in Taiwan's interest and in China's interest. It is not, however, in the US' interest to have China continue to determine the rules of the US-Taiwan relationship. The purpose is to permit better understanding between the US and Taiwan as the atmosphere in the region continues to change.
Nat Bellocchi is a former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expressed in this article are his own.
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