After being elected chairman of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has suggested quite a few novel reforms that have won the approval of KMT members. When he proposed a Taiwan discourse for the KMT, however, it was met with mixed reactions from KMT supporters.
The major difference between Ma's Taiwan discourse and former KMT chairman and president Lee Teng-hui's (
The measures included promoting local Taiwanese to leading positions in both the party and government, defining the nation as the Republic of China on Taiwan, and amending the Constitution to define the nation's scope and sovereignty. Ma, on the other hand, wants to return to the source to try to find a connection between the KMT and Taiwan, an approach which includes mentioning Chiang Wei-shui (
This may seem a thorough approach, but there is a risk that it may blur the focus and lead to too much talking. Sun started his revolution from abroad. He studied abroad and overseas Chinese associations were important early supporters of the revolution. If the participation in, or support for, Sun's revolution by individual Taiwanese is used to prove that there is a historical foundation for the relationship between the KMT and Taiwan, then the KMT has an even closer relationship with overseas associations in Hawaii or Japan. That does not mean, however, that we should call the KMT a local Hawaiian or Japanese party.
Another historical fact that cannot be denied is that the early 20th century was an era of revolution, in particular following the success of the Russian revolution, which resulted in an international revolutionary network. China's leftist revolutionary parties, Japan's leftist parties and even Taiwan's communist party were connected through this network. The KMT's close relationship with the Soviet Communist Party following the success of the KMT's revolution does not mean that the KMT was an appendix to the Soviet Communist Party or that the Soviet Communist Party was a localized Chinese party.
Private and commercial exchanges across the Taiwan Strait were not interrupted during the Japanese era. Such exchanges, however, are not sufficient to claim a political relationship across the Strait. The factors that really affected the cross-strait political relationship during the latter part of the 20th century were instead the outcome of World War II and the Chinese civil war.
The ethnic, cultural and geopolitical situation led to the natural development of cross-strait interactions that were destroyed only after the KMT arrived in Taiwan. For Taiwan at that time, the KMT was indeed a foreign government whose leadership included only a few Taiwanese. It was only later that it slowly absorbed the local elite and formed a network to control local politics.
A more reasonable explanation would be to say that after the KMT came to Taiwan and ended cross-strait exchanges it was as a foreign ruler that was forced to begin a localization process. The Cold War not only severed interaction between Taiwan and China, it also severed interaction between Taiwan's rulers and their mother country. Although the government continued to claim that the central plains of China were the center of the nation, the concrete foundation of its existence was Taiwan, and that was where it had to set root and localize.
Speaking historically, Lee's foreign government and localization discourses have more explanatory power than Ma's Taiwan discourse. The vigorous localization drive during Lee's presidency led to conflicts within the KMT's internal power distribution. These conflicts developed into contradictory national identities. The struggle between the mainstream and the fringe within the party, the creation of the New Party and even the recent KMT chairmanship election, reflect this conflict.
Ma obviously proposed his Taiwan discourse because he has realized that this conflict must be resolved. However, maybe that resolution should not involve returning to Sun, but rather finding a solution to the conflict that has followed from the localization process. This conflict is no longer restricted to the political elite, but has spread to society at large.
Today, many Taiwanese see the concepts "localization," "love Taiwan" and "self awareness" as being negative. Those dissatisfied with the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) rule have channeled that dissatisfaction toward smearing the image of Taiwan. In contrast to the government's vigorous promotion of positive news about Taiwan and its predictions about the demise of China, those dissatisfied with the government propagate negative news about Taiwan and loudly praise China's advances. This perverted mindset has already spread through a large segment of society, and it is also the reason Ma's Taiwan discourse proposition was not welcomed by pan-blue voters.
Without local self-awareness and a love for Taiwan, there can be no healthy and active development of cross-strait relations, or a healthy and active way of dealing with the international community. Ma's Taiwan discourse should be directed toward rebuilding the public's concern and affection for Taiwan.
Ku Er-teh is a freelance writer.
Translated by Perry Svensson
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with