Nuclear terrorism is a horrifying possibility, but it needn't be a paralyzing one. That's the message of a new book, Nuclear Terrorism: The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, by Graham Allison. He begins by sketching a realistic scenario in which as many as 1 million lives could be lost following explosion of a nuclear device in a large US city.
Understandably, most of us would rather talk about anything else. Unpleasant though it is, we should pay attention to the feasible steps that Allison argues can greatly reduce the probability of such an attack -- which has become a key US election issue.
ILLUSTRATION: YU SHA
Compared to the cost in human life, financial resources and international goodwill of the Iraq war, Allison argues that these steps are almost cheap. Formerly dean of Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and assistant secretary of defense for policy and plans in the first Clinton administration, the professor backs up his dire warnings with considerable expertise.
The heart of the book is Allison's list of the three Noes necessary to avoid calamity: no loose nukes, no new nukes and no new nuclear states.
The first, most important "no" requires that the US help secure Russia's poorly guarded stockpiles of fissile material -- enriched uranium and plutonium -- and nuclear weapons. Of particular concern is its supply of so-called suitcase nuclear bombs, many of which are unaccounted for.
Securing the stockpiles is being done in a limited way under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar Act, which was passed by Congress for this purpose. Allison argues, however, that it will take 13 years to secure all Russia's fissile material at the rate we're going, and that we should spend the money to help them do the job in four years (this position is endorsed by the Kerry campaign, to which Allison is a consultant).
Obtaining fissile material is the primary difficulty facing those trying to make a weapon. But with enough enriched uranium or plutonium, some knowledge of physics, and a little Internet surfing, a crude weapon can be made in less than a year. The unfortunate fact is that in Russia there is enough fissile material vulnerable to theft to make 30,000 additional nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, though it contains 90 per cent of all existing fissile material outside the US, Russia is not the only worry.
About 25 of the 130 nuclear research reactors in 40 countries contain sufficient fissile material to produce at least one nuclear bomb.
The second "no" requires that we ensure more fissile material is not produced by countries such as Iran, whose generators' avowed rationale is the peaceful production of electricity. Allison recommends strengthening the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Incentives might include a program in which countries with nuclear capabilities sell enriched uranium to those countries that want electricity from nuclear reactors.
Allison's third No requires that we limit the nuclear club to the present eight members -- the US, Russia, Britain, France, China, Pakistan, India and Israel. Both Iran and North Korea must be persuaded to give up their nuclear aspirations. Pressure must continue to be carefully applied to Pakistan, whose black marketers have been selling "nuclear starter kits" and consulting services.
All three of these "noes" require "muscular diplomacy." Given the way the US is viewed around the world, this will be more difficult than otherwise. This fact is at the root of Allison's contention that the Bush administration has misplaced priorities and has squandered opportunities to improve national security.
Implementation will be expensive. Allison's estimate of the cost of securing all fissile material in the world is US$30 billion, although eliminating more extreme vulnerabilities would cost considerably less. Work must be done in the US, too. As Allison notes, 30,000 lorries, 6,500 railway wagons and 140 ships bring in 50,000 cargo containers to the US every day, of which only one in 20 is screened.
Although crediting the Bush administration for quickly recognizing the nexus between terrorism and nuclear weapons, Allison decries its "absence of urgency" in dealing with nuclear proliferation.
A few of the book's premises, facts and conclusions may be questioned, but Nuclear Terrorism has a subtitle that everyone should take seriously.
John Allen Paulos is professor of mathematics at Temple University, Philadelphia.
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