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US-Taiwan ties need patching up

The Donald Keyser case has all the qualities of the classic Japanese film Rashomon, in which four different people give four radically different accounts of the same events.

Everyone involved in the Keyser case is telling a different story, and the flap has generated hubbub in all sectors of society.

The Taiwan government is now in damage control mode, looking for the source of the incident and the "spy" behind it.

But if it doesn't handle this case in an appropriate manner, it could do irreparable harm to Taiwan-US relations.

There are four respects in which the Keyser affair is likely to affect Taiwan. First, Keyser, who was in line to be the next chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, will now certainly not be taking up that post.

It is questionable whether another nominee will be as favorable to Taiwan.

Second, revelations of a "national security" leak will make US officials less forthcoming and more secretive in their regular meetings with Taiwanese officials and academics at Taiwan's US representative office.

Third, the official counterpart of Taiwan's National Security Bureau (NSB) is the CIA, but on the insistence of high officials in the US government, the matter is being handled by the State Department.

As the case has affected regular diplomatic and intelligence-gathering operations, it is possible that there will be friction between the diplomatic and national security units within Taiwan's representative office in the US.

Fourth, in the short term at least, the morale of intelligence agents working with the US will take a blow, and their freedom of action may also be more constrained.

In the investigation of the Keyser case, Taiwan may be able to minimize the damage to Taiwan-US relations and trust if it faces the matter truthfully, cooperates fully with the US, rewards and fairly punishes those involved and -- most of all -- maintains clear lines of diplomatic communication.

Even as national security and foreign affairs agencies try to limit the damage, the government should act on the idea that "honesty is the best policy."

But ultimately, compared to the issues that will impact mutual trust between the two countries, these are only peripheral matters.

September of last year, when Keyser made his secret visit to Taiwan, was a time when that trust had sharply deteriorated. Certainly, when President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) took office in 2000 and announced in 2002 "one country on each side of the Strait," relations had already begun to deteriorate.

But it was the announcement of the referendum question last June that pushed the relationship to a crisis point.

The situation got so bad that US President George Bush criticized Chen, albeit without referring to him by name, for wishing to change the status quo.

From that time relations between the US, China and Taiwan have been tense. Key events include Chen's many post-election press conferences proposing to amend the Constitution through a referendum, visits by US Vice President Dick Cheney and National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice to China in April and July respectively, repeated warnings to Taiwan from James Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and James Moriarty of the National Security Council, China's proposal to formulate a "unification" law, its Taiwan Affairs Office's May 17 declaration [to "put a resolute check on Taiwan independence activities"] and rumors of Bush's remarks expressing criticism of Chen.

In these circumstances, the quality of intelligence gathered through regular channels by Taiwan's representatives in the US is unlikely to satisfy the Chen administration.

Therefore, pressure on NSB personnel to gather intelligence will increase. And under this extreme pressure even highly trained operatives may make mistakes.

The Keyser case is different from conventional cases of diplomatic or intelligence personnel breaking the rules. Strictly speaking, it is a political case. Its significance depends on how it is considered.

I believe the best way to resolve the Keyser case is to discover its root cause.

That is to say, we should look at the big picture, and seek to reverse the decline in Taiwan-US relations of the last few years.

For example, in meeting the US demand that Taiwan not alter the status quo, we must do what we say and not try to play word games with the Americans. In the context of US-China-Taiwan relations, we should probably take a new tack, implementing policies that benefit the US, but also meet our own interests.

We must build on our commercial and technical strength, seek security assurances from the US and at the same time seek parity in our commercial dealings with China.

The Americans are great believers in mutual trust, and we must not promise them one thing and do another.

Only through matching our words with actions can we rebuild trust between the US and Taiwan, and thereby improve our relationship and enhance our security.

Edward Chen is the director of the Graduate Institute of American Studies at Tamkang University.

Translated by Ian Bartholomew
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