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Russia's ombudsman faces autocracy's huge caseload

Around the world, people worry that political freedom is disappearing in Vladimir Putin's Russia. Indeed, about the only people who are unconcerned about creeping authoritarianism in Russia are the Russians themselves.

Russians seem to care less about political freedom than they do about social welfare -- pensions, domestic violence, children's rights or police brutality. In fact, most Russians are indifferent to the government's efforts to curtail press freedom and limit the right to protest. Such apathy makes my task as Russia's ombudsman, an office charged by the State Duma (parliament) with protecting political rights in Russia, difficult, if not impossible.

The ombudsman acts as a bridge between the authorities and the people, seeking to resolve conflicts that arise between state bodies and citizens. My office is open not only to Russian citizens, but to foreigners and stateless people who feel their political rights have been compromised. The standards we apply are not only those contained in Russia's constitution, but also international legal principles and human rights norms, even if they sometimes contradict our constitution.

For example, as ombudsman I was opposed to curtailing the right of Russians to jury trials. Those who wanted to limit the use of juries supposedly feared a risk to state security in some instances. My office worked closely with the state to assure that, in most cases, juries are used.

Similarly, my office defended the liberal weekly newspaper Novoe Vremya (New Times), which was being pressured by Moscow's city government on the pretext of a commercial dispute about a lease. That fight is not over, but after my intervention, Moscow's authorities must take into account the public's negative attitude to their effort to quash this publication.

Of course, Russia provides far more headline-grabbing examples of political and human rights problems, such as the low-grade war in Chechnya or the Yukos affair. My office pays maximum attention to Chechnya, although this is not easy to do from Moscow. Indeed, I could spend all my time in Chechnya, but Russia has 89 regions with countless human rights issues to address. This is why I suggested to Putin that Chechnya have its own regional rights ombudsman who would spend all his time there. The new Chechen authorities seem to welcome this prospect.

As to the Yukos affair, my office cannot intervene in any legal process until it is completed. Former Yukos CEO Mikhail Khodorkovsky's lawyers have sent a complaint to the European Court for Human Rights in Strasbourg. If Khodorkovsky disagrees with the final decision of the Russian courts, he will undoubtedly appeal to that court. Only then will I be able to express an opinion.

Many observers nonetheless insist that those under criminal investigation should be released on bail instead of being kept in prison. Others say that this is not an option in Khodorkovsky's case, as he could easily jump bail and flee abroad. In fact, this is precisely what happened with other figures accused in the Yukos case.

All of these serious human rights questions expose the fact that Russia's legal institutions remains half-formed. For example, the Duma has taken far too long to enact a law on lobbying, which in most developed democracies clearly defines what constitutes acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Khodorkovsky might not be in as much trouble if such precise laws existed.

Unformed laws are directly related to unformed ideas. Human rights in Russia are often violated simply because people are not aware that they have some particular right. The most important strategic goal of my office is that people learn how to defend their rights better, and to make the authorities take the complaints of ordinary Russians into consideration. Sadly, most bureaucrats still look upon human rights values with disdain.

But the real problem for my office is neither ignorance nor legal infirmity, it is that in an underdeveloped legal system such as Russia's, my authority is mostly personal, and requires help from the mass media. Because concepts of human rights remain rudimentary, the best that can be hoped for is that awareness will slowly begin to take hold.

My tactical goal is thus to raise the public profile of the ombudsman's office in order to win more respect and recognition by both citizens and the state. This will be all but impossible without cooperation with non-governmental human rights organizations in Russia. Indeed, I view one of my tasks as being to facilitate contacts between these groups and the authorities. The government's response to these efforts will be an important indicator of whether and to what extent Putin's administration intends to include human and political rights within its so-called "dictatorship of law."

Vladimir Lukin, ombudsman of the Russian Federation, is a former Russian ambassador to the US and a co-founder of the liberal Yabloko party.

Copyright: Project Syndicate
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