On May 7, after the first meeting of the Chinese Nationalist Party's (KMT) task force on decision-making and discourse formula-ting, a conclusion was reached: "open our party, reform our country." The organizer, Vice Chairman Vincent Siew (蕭萬長), announced that a trip to South Korea will be made to learn from its experience. This plan attracted both praise and criticism.
A completely open attitude to reform is just a departure point rather than a destination. Undeniably, the KMT is suffering from a vacuum of a core discourse. The vision delineated by a party's core ideas forms the basis of its legitimacy.
The KMT began life 100 years ago as an aspiring revolutionist vowing to wipe out feudalism and march toward a republic. In the second stage of the KMT's history, it took up the role of China-defender and shifted its goal to the completion of unification and resistance to imperialist invasion. After settling in Taiwan, the party founded its legitimacy on opposing communism and regaining China according to the Three Principles of the People. Today, with the cross-strait relationship turning a new page, the existent discourse has lost its pertinence. Set against a blurred background of political reality, the existence of the KMT appears incongruous. How can the hollowed-out core ideas appeal to people and make them willing to sacrifice their lives for them?
The project of discourse reconstruction can start with three self-inquiries: Who is the KMT? Where is it and how do we perceive the present in history? Where is this KMT going and how do we envision the future? These inquiries will string all KMT discourses together. Does the KMT still represent the Three Principles of the People and five-power constitution? After we abandon reconquering the mainland and unifying China, where does our legitimacy come from?
What is the mainstream public opinion? Is the rising Taiwanese consciousness an awakened self-awareness? Or is it a sugar-coated Hoklo chauvinism? Does the trend "localization" comprehensively describe the current situation? Or is it a biased representation? Is national identification equal to ethnic identification? Is identity politics itself an end or a means? Have people become the subject of "Taiwan nationalism," or the object of a "neo-cultural hegemony"?
The KMT must consider whether its discourse of "Taiwanization" an counter "localization." We must decide if we are to refashion "localization" by "Tai-wanization." Other questions we should also ask include: Does the discourse of "New Democracy" contain the "New Cultural Discourse?" Does the content of the "New Democracy" imply a "new republic?" How do we define the Republic of China (ROC), the ROC "in" Taiwan and that the ROC "is" Taiwan? And how should the ROC face Taiwan? Shall the KMT redefine its role as the opposition in bipartisan politics? Shall the KMT, the People First Party and the New Party compete, converge or integrate?
This discourse reconstruction project should be initiated from bottom up in the KMT. The purpose of public debates is not only to enrich the discourse's content but also to identify similarities and differences among party lines.
Recently, the "New Cultural Discourse" pushed by the young members in the Democratic Progressive Party has been undermined by its own fundamentalists. The KMT's discourse might as well be challenged by the KMT conservatives. In fact, the question of choice is a must. Shunning the question of choice only unnerves the people even more.
In sum, the KMT's discourse reconstruction will be an open-ended process of seeking answers. Whether the answer will be positive or negative, the only thing remaining unchanged will be its openness.
Apollo Chen is a KMT legislator.
TRANSLATED BY WANG HSIAO-WEN
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with