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South China Sea requires rethink

Recent tensions with Vietnam are an urgent reminder that Taiwan needs to update its South China Sea policy.

Hanoi early this month accused Taipei of infringing upon its sovereignty in the Spratly Islands. In fact, the Coast Guard Administration merely intercepted and drove off Vietnamese fishing boats that had been poaching in Taiwan's territorial waters near Taiping Island, which is part of the Spratlys. Such incidents highlight the potential for a military crisis in the South China Sea and the necessity for Taiwan to avert an escalation.

Officially, Taiwan still claims all the islands in the South China Sea: the Spratlys, the Pratas, the Paracels and the Macclesfield Bank. Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Richard Shih reiterated that position recently in response to Vietnam's complaint.

Taiwan has effective jurisdiction only over the Pratas and Taiping Island, which are respectively about 390km southwest and 1,120km southeast of Kaohsiung.

The Spratlys are claimed either in part or in their entirety by Vietnam, China, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Taiwan's sovereignty over the Pratas, however, is only contested by Beijing and Manila.

Taiwan faces a strategic overstretch by not modifying its South China Sea policy. The Ministry of National Defense (MND) is also aware of the growing military imbalance across the Taiwan Strait resulting from China's missile buildup.

The MND realized in 1999 that the air force and the navy did not have the ability to project their power into the South China Sea without sacrificing the security of Taiwan, Matsu and Kinmen. It therefore withdrew troops from the Pratas and the Spratlys to focus on the defense of Taiwan's core territories.

Taiwan is also hurting its interests in Southeast Asia by not formulating a policy that would prevent clashes. One purpose of the replacement of troops on the Pratas and Taiping Island with coast guard personnel was to reduce tensions in the region. The skirmish with Vietnam obviously contradicts that goal and comes at a bad time for Taiwan.

Until recently, Beijing's behavior in the South China Sea was poor compared with Taipei's emphasis on peaceful means to solve disputes.

China clashed with Vietnam in 1974 over the Paracels, and in 1988 and 1992 over the Spratlys. It also quarreled with the Philippines over Mischief Reef in 1995. That year, the 10-member ASEAN condemned Beijing's bellicose actions in the Spratlys.

Taiwan, in contrast, has no such negative record. It only protested Malaysian and Vietnamese actions in the Spratlys in 1999.

But last year, China successfully marginalized Taiwan by reaching an agreement with ASEAN members. Under that agreement, all parties were to refrain from activities that could increase tensions in the South China Sea.

Though Taiwan was among the claimants, it was not a party to the deal.

China's recent charm offensive on the international stage just adds to Taiwan's isolation in the South China Sea, where its main ally, Washington, has no say and can therefore be of no assistance.

To regain some leverage in the region, Taiwan should first differentiate its position from that of China and drop its claim to the South China Sea as a whole.

This would strengthen Taiwan's sovereign status as a political entity separate from China. And it would help remove the suspicions of some Southeast Asian countries about Taiwan's intentions.

How can they take seriously President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) call for the formation of an "Asian Democratic Alliance" to promote democracy in the region while Taiwan still has an expansionist foreign policy?

Taiwan, however, should not give up control of the Pratas. They have a significant strategic value because they command the entire southern mouth of the Taiwan Strait.

On the other hand, Taiwan could adopt a softer stance on the Spratlys. There is no civilian population on Taiping Island and fishing vessels do not represent a military threat. The Spratlys have abundant fishing resources and huge reserves of oil and natural gas. But Taiwan's true interest in the Spratlys is to prevent China from opening a second front. Were Beijing to gain a dominant position in the South China Sea, it could launch an attack from behind.

In that regard, Taiwan should use its occupation of Taiping Island as a tool for bilateral cooperation with China's main rival in the Spratlys: Vietnam.

Trung Latieule is a freelance reporter based in Taipei.
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