Talk about "Asian Values" is rarely heard nowadays. Its currency seems to have been devalued along with East Asia's once booming economies. For Asia's financial crisis of a few years back uncovered many excesses that hid behind the rhetoric of Asian values -- the cozy relations between governments and elites; rampant corruption, cronyism and nepotism.
But of equal importance in causing this diminishment is the fact that real reformers came to power in some Asian states, such as Kim Dae-jung in South Korea, and brought with them a more universal view of human rights. Good governance -- in both the public and private sectors -- is the post-crisis mantra. With transitions underway in Thailand and Indonesia, democracy is increasingly what Asians want. Although a return to the old discourse about Asian values is unlikely, some Asians may nevertheless reassert their differences on human rights, democracy and governance as memories of the crisis grow distant.
The worst reason for this will be the oldest reason: some pre-crisis elites retain influence and/or power. Because reform threatens their privileges, it must be resisted. Other former elites may try to link self-protection to anti-Western rhetoric and nationalist sentiment. This holds the potential to be a potent weapon in dealing with outsiders like the IMF, or when foreigners buy [at bargain prices] into banks, public utilities and big companies.
Alongside elite self-interest, the pain of ordinary workers and citizens is a genuine and widespread concern. Displaced by new competition, workers have gone on strike in countries like Korea, where the old "iron bowl" of employment protection has shattered. In Thailand, the rural poor organized against a reform minded Democrat government while its party rivals canvassed on the old politics of patronage and money. If united, entrenched elites and the mass of workers and the poor can create a powerful stumbling block to reform.
Lingering resentments about colonization may also be tapped. Many segments of society still harbor reservations about foreigners and foreign investors, not only in countries new to global markets, like Vietnam, but even in countries with decades of economic openness. Moreover, in the wake of IMF-imposed remedies, many Asians feel marginalized. This is why Malaysia's Premier, Dr. Mahathir Mohammed, strikes a cord beyond his country when he rails against American hegemony. Nationalism in Asia is both a proud and convenient flag to hide behind.
A newer reason renewing Asia's sense of difference is that, thus far, human rights and democracy have not delivered good governance, stability or growth. Human rights advocates in Indonesia, for example, used the crisis to argue for political prisoners to be released, for East Timor to be given its independence, and for provincial human rights violations to be investigated. But this was no recipe for restoring stability and growth.
To succeed in restoring a strong growth path, East Asia must deliver justice for more than individual human rights violations. As the proponents of Asian values argued, all human rights -- civil and political as well as social and economic -- need to be strengthened. If not, advocates of democracy and human rights will face a backlash. Already, some Indonesians are nostalgic for Suharto's new order.
A third, newly emerging reason for an Asian approach to human rights is more benign. It is an increasing sense that the aim should be to be both universal and Asian, not one or the other. For the crisis of 1997-98 brought Asians closer together. Governments cooperate more fully through the ASEAN plus 3 process that links 13 East Asian countries. A greater sense of regional identity exists even if regional cooperation is limited and most people think it should not take the form of a closed bloc or union.
Open regionalism is an edict not only for the trade regime. It can also apply to other areas of cooperation, including human rights. So, the idea of an ASEAN or Asian regional mechanism should be re-evaluated. Asia is, after all, the only continent without such a regime to complement international institutions. The time may now be right because some countries have started their human rights commissions.
Indeed, the new generation in the region is both more Asian and more open to the universal. For them, an understanding of the US and US-influenced international standards is second nature. The influence has come through popular and consumer culture as well as private sector business, non-government organizations and civil society groups. But this does not mean that Asia will be homogenized, like a McDonalds' franchise.
A new Asian culture is being articulated. Much of it is set within a Western framework, but some particulars do differ. In Asia, hybrids are emerging that are both modern and "universal" while still being Asian. Significantly, what is emerging is being negotiated at the level of individuals and communities, not states and national leaders.
Asia cannot go back to what was before. But unless stability, growth and a sense of confidence are renewed, greater tension with the West and narrow forms of pan-Asian nationalism are possible. This need not be antagonistic, as in the past. The hope this time is that Asia's people -- not just their semi-autocratic leaders -- seek their own balance between the universal and a redefined sense of what Asia is.
Simon SC Tay is chairman of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs and Professor of law at the National University of Singapore.
Copyright: Project Syndicate
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