On Sept. 11, the US was struck by the most severe terrorist attacks in its history. Not only did the twin towers of the World Trade Center collapse, but the Pentagon was also damaged by a hijacked plane, causing an enormous loss of lives. Although the attacks took place in the US and were not directly linked to cross-strait affairs, we should not ignore the possible impact the attacks might have on our own diplomacy.
Since coming to power, the George W. Bush administration has been criticized for its hardline stance on international affairs. For example, its refusal to implement the 1997 Kyoto Protocol to curb global warming has been protested by environmentalists worldwide. Its insistence on establishing a national missile defense (NMD) system has been objected to by most European countries, and its role in the Middle East peace talks may have served as an indirect cause of last week's terrorist attacks this time.
As for Sino-US relations, Cold-War rhetoric has once again become popular since the pro-China Red Team was replaced by the Blue Team and withdrew from US policy-making bodies, such as the foreign, defense, security and other government agencies. The shift in thinking also led to the US' large-scale arms sales to Taiwan, its enthusiastic welcome of President Chen Shui-bian's (陳水扁) stopover in New York and Bush's promise to do "whatever it took" to defend Taiwan.
Sino-US relations reached a 20-year low with the EP-3 collision incident in April. Although the subsequently tense relations have improved -- as demonstrated by US Secretary of State Colin Powell's one-day visit to Beijing on July 28 -- their differences on the Taiwan issue, as well as the NMD and theater missile defense (TMD) issues, still remain.
In regards to Taiwan, the US has expanded its arms sales while providing greater support to Tai-wan privately, despite the fact that the US has repeatedly affirmed that it would abide by the "one China" principle and would not support Taiwan independence. For the NMD and TMD issues, the US has obviously had its strategic focus shifted to East Asia, which is much more threatening to China.
Under such circumstances, I believe that Sino-US relations may cool down again based on the following reasons:
One, in 1995, People's Liberation Army Deputy Chief of Staff Xiong Guangkai (
Two, in the book Unlimited War (
Three, the arms race over the Taiwan Strait heated up after the US boosted its arms sales to Taiwan. The Chinese government is worried that Taiwan and the US may form a military alliance against Beijing -- through the sales and Taiwan's entry to the TMD system.
Such a worry is not entirely groundless. After the 1996 cross-strait missile crisis, the US bombing of the Chinese embassy in Yugoslavia, as well as the EP-3 incident, a series of cases has made China believe that the US has viewed Beijing as a potential strategic rival, instead of a strategic partner. The possibility of the US directly interfering in cross-strait affairs is also very high should there be a war over the Strait. That being so, China can hardly achieve its goal of unification if the US problem is not solved.
In fact, Beijing has put great emphasis on preparing for possible US military interference in its affairs. The Chinese government has held an unprecedented amount of military exercises in Shanghai, Beijing and Guangzhou this year, and has repeatedly taken the US as its imagined enemy in these exercises. Its efforts to build or to purchase modern warships, Su-30 MKK fighters, nuclear-missile submarines and navigation satellites have all been made with US warfare in mind.
Moreover, China had a military exercise code-named "Liberation One" on and around its Dongshan island (東山島) from April to August. The four-month-long "attack on Taiwan" exercise was unprecedented in the history of the PLA in view of its length. Its main purpose was to prepare for dealing with possible US interference in the cross-strait conflict.
Consequently, it can be predicted that Sino-US relations will cool down again in the near future, particularly as the US is now busy enough with its own affairs. Such a circumstance, however, would not necessarily be advantageous to Taiwan. Although the two sides of the Strait have always been antagonistic toward each other, the situation has been clear and predictable. But uncertainties have risen since the US factor was added to cross-strait affairs.
As the old Chinese saying goes, "It is difficult for a small country to survive between two large ones." Taiwan should act cautiously since it is the small country with very little say.
Liu Kuang-hua is an assistant professor at the applied English department of Ming Chuan University.
Translated by Eddy Chang
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