Taiwan has long since become accustomed to US Congressional visits. For the members of Con-gress, these trips aren't as much fun as they used to be -- when foreign counterpart funds were available for them to spend, and when their constituencies were not as tuned in to foreign relationships as they are today. Still, the visits gave Taiwan a good reminder of the breadth of domestic differences in America over policies toward Taiwan and China.
Within just a few days, Taiwan was visited by the chairmen of the committees in both Houses of Congress responsible for foreign relations. Each had come with a message for Taiwan -- their own, not necessarily the administra-tion's, nor even, for that matter, what their fellow committee members might want to say. Senator Joseph Biden's public statements were about security; Congressman Henry Hyde's on democracy.
Biden's public statements in Taiwan had a different emphasis from those released to the press, and to his constituency, when he returned. In pre-arrival statements and comments to the media while in Taiwan, his focus seemed to be getting the message to Taiwan (and to China?) that despite statements by President George W. Bush, there was no change in US policy regarding security commitments in the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA).
Though a formal declaration of independence by Taiwan is far less likely than an attack by the China against Taiwan, he seems to hold a strong notion that the people of Taiwan must be reminded that they should not misunderstand America's commitment. In his visit to Beijing subsequently, he did not balance that point with his hosts there, ie that China should not misunderstand America's resolve. In Biden's press release back home, the emphasis was on the deep support Taiwan had in the Senate, US willingness to do its part to safeguard Taiwan under the TRA, and encouraging cross-strait dialogue.
Hyde's visit centered around the speech he gave to the Chinese National Association of Industry and Commerce in Taipei. Its focus was on democracy. Back home he had his speech put on his Web site and the State Department repeated it in its e-mail distribution.
The speech was a call by him to see Taiwan as an opportunity, not a liability. That is not a new thought. It is based on the premise that America's objective is to support the expansion of democracy around the world. That democratic Taiwan, so geographically close to the largest authoritarian country in the world, and so culturally close as well, sets an example that could be of fundamental importance in democratizing China.
That is a notion that many foreign policy experts, including China-oriented ones, find too idealistic. Hyde argues that recent history demonstrates such influence from outside has indeed helped people to overturn their authoritarian governments. But more important, as is more evident in the House of Representatives than in the more exclusive Senate, a great many, perhaps even most, people in the US believe this is so. Some political leaders may actively support it, and some may not, but none can afford to ignore this underlying belief.
Since the US recognized
Beijing, this internal political struggle between perceived interests and established principles in US policy toward China and Taiwan has continued. American presidents have found it necessary to maintain a balance in the relationship between the two sides of the strait. Carter tried to ignore the Congress when he switched relations from Taipei to Beijing. He wound up with the TRA -- a unique law that ever since has challenged the pre-eminence of the Executive Branch on this foreign policy issue.
Ronald Reagan, a very pro-Taiwan president, was nonetheless pressed to agree on the "82 Communique" limiting arms sales to Taiwan. Not only his own preference but that of his conservative constituency, and the Congress, quickly moved to neutralize the affect of the communique by the six assurances, and subsequently by continuing arms sales. In the George H. Bush presidency, the White House was considered to have moved much closer to Bei-jing. Bush took considerable political heat in sending emissaries to Beijing immediately following the Tiananmen disaster, however. He later agreed to support Taiwan's membership in the GATT (now the WTO), sent a Cabinet officer to visit Taipei for the first time since relations were switched and agreed to the sale of 150 F-16s.
The Clinton years saw the balancing act move in both directions. He began by being highly critical of the Beijing regime. Then after one year he flip-flopped to a more moderate stance. Circumstances -- the missile crisis of 1996 -- caused him to challenge Beijing, but this was then followed by an effort to mollify it, trying to encourage more benign behavior by China. The balance grew even more toward Beijing in his
agreeing to the statement on the three no's. The resulting outcry, especially from the Congress, brought another reversal, with Clinton assuring that the assent of the people of Taiwan was an essential requirement for any change in Taiwan's political status.
The present administration started its relationship with China with the Hainan incident. Where it will go from there doubtless will be clearer when Bush visits Beijing in October. As for the Con-gress, the two visits this month demonstrated that the traditional differences over policy are still very much alive in that body. Aside from the usual encouragement of a peaceful resolution and a cross-strait dialogue, one other policy now seems to have a consensus in Congress. There is general acceptance that a better dialogue between the US and Taiwan is necessary. That point, I am sad to say, has taken some 10 years, if not more, to get accepted. This new dialogue already has begun on security matters.
Another point is that Biden and Hyde each had a separate mes-sage, one that reflected the top priorities of the moment in the relationship. Economic matters, the basis of the US-Taiwan relationship for so many years, remain important but now increasingly are folded into international organizations such as WTO. There is still much to be done, however. Taiwan's security and its democracy are still matters that should be included in international discourse.
Nat Bellocchi is the former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan and is now a special adviser to the Liberty Times Group. The views expres-sed in this article are his own.
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