Elections in Taiwan do not just involve domestic forces; they are also affected by external influences. In most cases, the US plays a pivotal role.
In delivering his regular report to members of the Legislative Yuan two days ago, Chen Hsi-fan (
Chen, a veteran diplomat of a conservative stamp, told lawmakers that President Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) announcement of the "state-to-state" relationship between Taiwan and China in July 1999 had damaged Taipei's relations with Washington.
Chen said: "Although we have a different interpretation of `state-to-state' relations, it goes without saying that for the United States, it has already influenced relations of mutual trust." Chen also emphasized that not until the new president is elected in the US next year will further progress in the relationship between Washington and Taipei be made.
Chen's report revealed that President Lee's unilateral announcement of the "state-to-state" relationship across the Taiwan Strait, without prior notification to Washington, put new constraints on US-Taiwan relations. Nevertheless, Lee said he understood what Chen meant when Chen reported to him next day.
Chen's statement coincided with Los Angeles Times columnist Jim Mann's "open letter" to Lee two weeks ago. In the letter, Mann openly warned Lee that, "the Americans are afraid of you. Washington is truly nervous about what you might try to do during your last months in office." In other words, what Washington worries about most now in terms of cross-strait relations is not whether the KMT in Taiwan will stay in power after next March's presidential election, but the extent to which Lee will be "predictable" for the remainder of his term.
How can these two things be related? Why would Chen dare to make public the American reaction toward Lee's redefinition of cross-strait relations without prior discussion with Lee? Does the electoral element play a role here?
Two possible scenarios may answer this question. First, Chen is known as an old-style diplomatic bureaucrat much influenced by "Great China national consciousness." As the "front liner" in charge of explaining the government's policy toward Washington, he often finds himself caught in Lee's gradual move toward Taiwan's de facto independence and Washington's pressure to prevent Taipei from "rocking the boat" by provoking Beijing. It is therefore understandable for Chen to unleash some of his "personal feelings" about this difficult job. What is curious is that he should do this before notifying Lee?
Another possibility is to alleviate potential worry created by Mann's column. Since Mann implied that even if Lien Chan (連戰) wins the election next March, Lee is sill the chairman of the KMT. Given that Lien has never shown any determination to pull back from the "state-to-state" position, Lee might continue to dominate cross-strait affairs even after he relinquishes office. This possibility frightens the State Department.
The electoral concern scenario, however, has its own limits. Chen's report to the lawmakers also unveiled Washington's opposition to vice president Lien Chan's suggestion the other day that Taiwan could develop long-range missiles. How does this translate in the context outlined above? The only answer, it seems to me, is that Washington is not confident in any of the top three candidates. The Chinese government may already have its money on James Soong (
Liu Shih-chung is deputy director of the DPP's Department of International Affairs.
Recently, China launched another diplomatic offensive against Taiwan, improperly linking its “one China principle” with UN General Assembly Resolution 2758 to constrain Taiwan’s diplomatic space. After Taiwan’s presidential election on Jan. 13, China persuaded Nauru to sever diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Nauru cited Resolution 2758 in its declaration of the diplomatic break. Subsequently, during the WHO Executive Board meeting that month, Beijing rallied countries including Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Belarus, Egypt, Nicaragua, Sri Lanka, Laos, Russia, Syria and Pakistan to reiterate the “one China principle” in their statements, and assert that “Resolution 2758 has settled the status of Taiwan” to hinder Taiwan’s
Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s (李顯龍) decision to step down after 19 years and hand power to his deputy, Lawrence Wong (黃循財), on May 15 was expected — though, perhaps, not so soon. Most political analysts had been eyeing an end-of-year handover, to ensure more time for Wong to study and shadow the role, ahead of general elections that must be called by November next year. Wong — who is currently both deputy prime minister and minister of finance — would need a combination of fresh ideas, wisdom and experience as he writes the nation’s next chapter. The world that
Can US dialogue and cooperation with the communist dictatorship in Beijing help avert a Taiwan Strait crisis? Or is US President Joe Biden playing into Chinese President Xi Jinping’s (習近平) hands? With America preoccupied with the wars in Europe and the Middle East, Biden is seeking better relations with Xi’s regime. The goal is to responsibly manage US-China competition and prevent unintended conflict, thereby hoping to create greater space for the two countries to work together in areas where their interests align. The existing wars have already stretched US military resources thin, and the last thing Biden wants is yet another war.
Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, people have been asking if Taiwan is the next Ukraine. At a G7 meeting of national leaders in January, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida warned that Taiwan “could be the next Ukraine” if Chinese aggression is not checked. NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg has said that if Russia is not defeated, then “today, it’s Ukraine, tomorrow it can be Taiwan.” China does not like this rhetoric. Its diplomats ask people to stop saying “Ukraine today, Taiwan tomorrow.” However, the rhetoric and stated ambition of Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) on Taiwan shows strong parallels with