Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Lien Chan (
The KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) have a long, entangled history. Talks between them are not harmful if the public's rights are not involved.
However, since Beijing insists that "one China" refers to the People's Republic of China (PRC), neither Lien's nor Soong's visit will benefit Taiwan's pursuit of a recognition of two equal, sovereign nations on both sides of the Strait, nor the establishment of real peace. If they are careless, they may trigger internal conflict and polarize opinion between pro-unification and pro-independence forces. While Lien is visiting China, we would like to remind him:
First, following Japanese colonial rule, although the people of Taiwan suffered under the KMT government's martial law for 38 years, they took advantage of the limited freedom available to them to strive for democracy, and accomplished the first transfer of power in 2000. The KMT itself witnessed this process of Taiwan's democratization. Although it was defeated in presidential elections, it should keep its faith in our own democratic system, and should not denounce our democratic achievements when meeting political leaders from the other side.
If Lien can take this opportunity to declare to Beijing the party's recognition of democratic values, and explain that even after its transformation from the governing to the opposition party, the KMT is still able to win many legislative seats and participate in national affairs, this will show the party's magnitude and vision, and win the world's applause.
Second, the former KMT government failed to end the military confrontation between the two sides of the Strait. As an opposition party today, it has no position to represent Taiwan in signing an "agreement for terminating the state of war." The civil war between the KMT and the CCP naturally came to an end when power was transferred peacefully to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) from the KMT, and it is not necessary to sign any agreement. The DPP has never declared the CCP to be a rebellious group. Even if the DPP government has taken over the KMT government's baggage of the "separate governance of the two sides," this does not mean that it should automatically continue the hatred between the KMT and the CCP.
During his visit, Lien should express at an appropriate time that the KMT-CCP civil war became history when the party lost power. This method can easily resolve the problem in Article 8 of the "Anti-Secession" Law, which states that "The Taiwan question is one that is left over from China's civil war of the late 1940s. Solving the Taiwan question and achieving national reunification is China's internal affair."
Third, following several visits to China by high-ranking officials of the KMT, Soong has also accepted an invitation from Hu for a similar trip. These "go-west" moves have caused a disturbance in Taiwan's party politics and further complicated the government's cross-strait policies. If the opposition loses sight of the fact that their survival and development must be rooted in Taiwan and if their China visits fall into China's "united front" trap, they will be upbraided for being traitors and for "selling out Taiwan." In the end they would regret this as an unwise move and a costly political bid.
Fourth, if "one China under the Constitution" means that the legitimacy of Taiwan's government is based on the Constitution of the Republic of China, this is simply a description of fact. If Lien and Soong's view of the so called "1992 consensus" is "one China, with each side having its own interpretation," "one China" for Taiwan is the Republic of China. Lien and Soong, being politicians, must follow their principles and keep their word.
They must keep in mind their status as the leaders of Taiwan's opposition parties when holding dialogues with Hu, and must not make any concessions when speaking about Taiwan's sovereignty. Otherwise, the nature of their visits to China will be seen by the public as being for the benefit of themselves and their political parties, without giving any thought to Taiwan's sovereignty.
Fifth, a poll conducted by the Taiwan Thinktank on April 24 revealed that more than 70 percent of people think that without the government's authorization, Lien's China visit is inappropriate. Almost 64 percent of people consider the character of Lien's China visit as "individual and civic," and not pertaining to public authority.
Politicians must understand that in order to deal with cross-strait relations, they must keep a tight grip on the democratic process and legal principles. In other words, any agreement reached between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must go through the democratic process to win support from the people of Taiwan in a manner consistent with the law.
In sum, for both the "Hu-Lien meeting" and the "Hu-Soong meeting," the security and interests of Taiwan's people should be valued above the interests of individual political parties. They must not let Hu do as he pleases; otherwise, they will be unable to create a better cross-strait situation and could take an irreversible step toward political disaster.
Discussing cross-strait issues with China's government is a complicated, almost impossible mission. Politicians must not engage in wishful thinking and use cross-strait issues as a tool for their domestic maneuvering. If Lien and Soong truly love Taiwan, we urge them to listen to us. And upon their return, they must begin to encourage their parties to engage seriously in unfinished legislative business.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG AND LIN YA-TI
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