Recently, anti-Japanese protests have taken place in China's major cities.
Surprisingly, some people in Taiwan have suggested that we shouldn't choose a side in the confrontation between China and the US-Japan alliance.
This is bizarre.
"Choosing a side" basically means supporting a foreign country's policy, or even allying with it.
Although Taiwan and China complement each other economically, they are at loggerheads on military and strategic questions. Anyone can see that the situation will not be resolved for a long time -- and will probably become even worse.
By comparison, Taiwan has normal economic and trade relations with the US and Japan, and does not have any military or strategic disputes at all.
The only possible conflict is the problem of sovereignty over the Diaoyu Islands. But neither Taiwan nor Japan has any troops deployed on the island or its neighboring islets at the moment.
Besides, the islands are currently governed by Japan in reality, and the Japanese government is unlikely to take the initiative in changing the status quo.
The possibility of a military conflict between Taiwan and Japan does not exist unless Taipei suddenly takes military action.
If conflicts occur between China and the US-Japan alliance, the latter will continue to protect Taiwan even if it maintains a neutral stance.
In contrast, Taiwan can hardly gain much benefit from China. If China is attacked by the US and Japan, can we expect Beijing to have the extra reserves to help us resist political, economic and even military pressure from Washington and Tokyo?
If conflicts occur between Taiwan and China, there is still a possibility that the country may fall into Beijing's hands -- even if the US and Japan make every effort to safeguard it.
Take the Vietnam War, for example. The US actually sent hundreds of thousands of soldiers to the battlefield, and spent hundreds of billions of US dollars on it.
Although Japan did not mobilize its troops, it allowed the US to use its military bases and indirectly supported the US war.
Today, there is a gap between the strength of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.
If Taiwan dithers between taking China or Japan's side in the current dispute, it will be digging its own grave, because the US and Japan may have doubts and become unwilling to support it wholeheartedly.
China is therefore an undesirable side for Taiwan to choose. In fact, it is our potential enemy No. 1.
From a military and strategic perspective, cross-strait relations are akin to a "zero-sum" game.
No matter how smooth their relations, the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China are enemies with absolutely irreconcilable differences.
Even if we choose China over Japan, Beijing is still unlikely to withdraw its military threats against Taiwan.
To China, unifying with Taiwan has always been considered a core strategic interest. It will not give up such a strategic interest simply because we curry favor with it or show sincerity to it in certain ways.
On the contrary, Taipei's attitude could incite hostility from Washington and Tokyo.
So the idea of "choosing a side" should not even be an issue in our strategic thinking.
Bill Chang is a former deputy director of the Democratic Progressive Party's Chinese Affairs Department.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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