President Chen Shui-bian's (
Both pro-independence and pro-China advocates can find in Chen's speech things to like and dislike. For example, the Taiwan Solidarity Union agreed with Chen's statement that "Taiwan is the Republic of China, and the Republic of China is Taiwan," but found it difficult to accept his proposition that "both sides use the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong" to seek possible schemes that are "not necessarily perfect but acceptable." The pan-blue camp in turn questions the possibility that Chen accepts the arrangement of "one country, two systems."
Of course, Chen will not accept such an arrangement. That is why he steered away from the terms "1992 consensus" and "1992 one China principle," and spoke instead of using "the basis of the 1992 meeting in Hong Kong." He did so because there was actually no consensus reached in 1992 and the meeting held in Hong Kong was to resolve issues arising from cross-strait exchanges and interactions. It was an occasion when both sides put aside political controversies to seek solutions. This spirit of seeking commonalities among differences is desperately needed under the current circumstances of Beijing and Taipei having little trust in each other. Chen took the initiative to hold out an olive branch and suggested using the practical issue of charter flights for passengers and cargo as a starting point for dialogue. Now it is up to Beijing to respond.
Taiwan wants peace across the Taiwan Strait, but peace will not simply descend from heaven; it can only result from a complex negotiation process. Taiwan should not lose control over the process by which peace can be achieved. China has deployed more than 600 missiles targeting Taiwan, and neither Taiwan nor the international community can pretend that they do not exist. It is for this reason that Taiwan should not forego its arms procurement. Even if China and Taiwan engage in direct talks, Taiwan's arms procurements and preparedness are essential to create military confidence mechanisms that can be testified to by the international community. Ensuring a proper military balance across the Taiwan Strait is essential to prevent military adventurism that might destabilize the region.
In terms of international politics, many countries in the region agree that the tension across the Taiwan Strait cannot be ignored. Threatened by China, this nation can appreciate the anxiety of the international community over this tension. Taiwan has worked hard to find a solution, and its efforts have been rec-ognized by both the US and Japan. Chen's speech is further proof that this nation is not the troublemaker in the region.
Chen's speech was a response to China's May 17 statement about cross-strait negotiations, direct links and trade. It remains unclear whether China's leaders will see in the speech the differences between China and Taiwan that will lead to disaster or the similarities between them that will lead to peace.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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