During his visit to China, US Vice President Dick Cheney met with the top four leaders, President Hu Jintao (
All the "four big heads" indeed focused on that issue, demanding that Washington keep its promises of insisting on the "one China" policy and opposing Taiwan independence and any changes to the status quo. They also demanded that Washington not send any "wrong messages" to Taipei.
But Cheney did not give in to the Chinese pressure. He even defended the US Taiwan policy in response to Beijing's opposition to the sale of a long-range early-warning radar system to Taiwan, as well as US commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act. He also stressed that the US has increased sales of defensive weapons to Taiwan due to China's expansion of ballistic missile deployment.
Still, he reaffirmed once again that the US does not support Taiwan's independence, and that "the US government is opposed to any unilateral moves on either side to change the status quo."
Cheney's remarks seemed to be a major disappointment to China. In fact, in the hope that perhaps he would come up with some unfavorable words about Taiwan, China's Taiwan Affairs Office cancelled its two regular press conferences after Taiwan's presidential election on March 20, wishing to make a fuss about Cheney's comments right before President Chen Shui-bian's (
Unfortunately, Cheney's call for an early resumption of cross-strait talks failed to attract Beijing's attention. In his speech at Shanghai's Fudan University last Thursday, his advocacy of both freedom and democracy, and the freedom to choose national leaders, also failed to attract any response there.
It remains to be seen whether his trip to China can add some points to the re-election bid of US President George W. Bush.
Looking into the future, Cheney's declarations that the US opposes any unilateral changes to the status quo across the Strait will remain the keynote in the triangular relationship.
Yang Chih-heng is an associate professor in the Graduate Institute of Southeast Asian Studies at Tamkang University.
TRANSLATED BY EDDY CHANG
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