Fri, Mar 19, 2004 page9

• From headache to migraine: why China can't really celebrate

  • By Sushil Seth
  • • 
    • 
    • 

  For Beijing, Taiwan is a perpetual headache, the pain of which only increases at election time. But whoever wins the presidential election, the Taiwan question will not go away because most Taiwanese are opposed to forsaking their political identity.

  Beijing, on the other hand, insists that Taiwan is simply a renegade province and must be unified with the motherland by persuasion, coercion or by force, if necessary. It fears Taiwan becoming independent. If that were to happen, Beijing may well seek to bring about forcible unification.

  Indeed, in 1996, when Taiwan held its first direct presidential election, China did stage a dramatic show of force in the Taiwan Strait to emphasize its intentions. At the time, Beijing regarded the holding of a presidential election as a move towards eventual separatism.

  But the massive show of force didn't work. It galvanized the US into moving two of its aircraft carriers into the region to deter China. The presidential election went ahead. And former president Lee Teng-hui (李登輝), whom Beijing hated the most, was confirmed as the nation's first directly elected president.

  In 2000, Beijing again warned of dire consequences to prevent the election of Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁), who seemed to favor separatism. It was once again counterproductive, helping Chen to win the election and allow Taiwan's first transfer of power.

  This time around Beijing is worried all over again. Chen appears committed, if re-elected, to push for a new constitution.

  But Beijing is not making it easy for political moderates in Taiwan. For instance, its recent moves to silence proponents of democratic liberalism in Hong Kong by threatening to abandon the "one country, two systems" formula will only make Taiwanese more nervous.

  China has been trying to lure Taiwan with the Hong Kong autonomy model. But seven years after regaining the territory from the UK, it is already talking of reviewing the 50-year autonomy agreement. Yet China appears unconcerned about the impact of this on Taiwan.

  Beijing apparently hopes that "peaceful" unification will result from a progressive loss of internal cohesion and unity within Taiwan. For instance, Taiwan's business class is keen to expand investment and marketing opportunities in a growing Chinese economy. And its low labor costs and industrial stability make it a very competitive base for international exports.

  As a result, powerful economic interests in Taiwan tend to advocate greater economic integration with China by neutralizing political issues.

  At the popular level, even though most people embrace a Taiwanese identity, they are not unhappy with their country's ambiguous status of a de facto sovereign nation. They are concerned, though, when Beijing starts pointing missiles across the Taiwan Strait.

  Interestingly, China's bellicosity has been muted lately. Beijing believes that the tide is turning in its favor. According to Current Events Report, a Communist Party publication, "we have basically contained the overt threat of Taiwanese independence since [President] Chen took office, avoiding a worst-case scenario

  and maintaining the status of Taiwan as part of China."

  It also believes that "the balance of power in the [Taiwan] Strait continues to shift in our favor."

  Beijing was also heartened by an implied rebuke of Taiwan in December from US President George W. Bush, who cautioned Chen against unilateral decisions "that change the status quo."

  In the circumstances, Beijing is probably satisfied with the status quo. It hopes that unification will follow in due course, dictated by the logic of China's growing economy and Taiwan's need to be part of it.

  Even though Taiwan is a democratic entity in its own right and a successful economy, its security is ultimately underwritten by the US. For instance, the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act requires the US "to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan."

  Under the Bush administration, there has been a progressive cementing of defense ties between the US and Taiwan, notwithstanding Beijing's displeasure. It was Bush who said that the US would defend Taiwan with "whatever it takes."

  Indeed, Washington is keen

  to sell billions of US dollars of advanced weaponry to Taiwan to defend against a sudden Chinese attack. But Taipei is less than enthusiastic about spending all that money. Besides, it doesn't want Washington to become complacent about Taiwan's defense capability. It would rather have the US on the scene sooner, rather than later, in case of military conflict.

  If Beijing were only contending with Taipei, it would have annexed Taiwan much earlier. But it will have to contend with Washington if it were to use force. In the past it sought to test US resolve but didn't find it wanting. The signs so far from growing US-Taiwan defense ties and US strategic interests are that Washington will stand by its commitment.

  But over-stretched as it is in Iraq and Afghanistan, and needing China's political support on terrorism and North Korea, the US could do without another military front. It is, therefore, not surprising that Washington is cautioning Taipei and urging it not to change the status quo. It doesn't want Beijing provoked into any rash military adventure.

  At the same time, preoccupied as China is with its economic growth to become another superpower, it is likely to play a waiting game on Taiwan, believing that time is on its side. It probably hopes that the US other commitments will wear it down over a period of time, thus enabling China to step into the resulting vacuum by default.

  In this scenario, Taiwan's fractious polity and internal disunity will do the rest, with people on the island reading the writing on the wall. Even a powerful US might not be able to salvage the situation in the event of an internal collapse.

  But there is another scenario, which is that China could collapse before Taiwan does. Its communist regime is a superstructure built on political quicksand without any popular legitimacy. When the fall comes, like it did for the Soviet Union, there might not be any alternative institutional framework to fall back on.

  Sushil Seth is a freelance writer based in Sydney.
• Most Popular

  • 1

    CGA urges China not to use shipwreck for gain

  • 2

    China ‘incentives’ fail to sway Taiwan

  • 3

    Taipei-born US astronaut to visit Taiwan next week

  • 4

    KMT voices concern over migrant worker plan

  • 5

    Cuts to amusement tax advanced