Everyone knows that two's company and three's a crowd, but is that true of Europe's top political leaders as well as ordinary mortals?
British Prime Minister Tony Blair will be better able to answer this question after today's Berlin summit with French President Jacques Chirac and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder.
The prime minister is understandably keen on the idea of muscling in on the Franco-German couple. By taking the initiative on defense he has already helped repair some of the damage caused by the Iraq war, when Jacques and Gerhard were driving the "axis of weasels." But that may be the easy bit.
Longer-term, Blair believes, being in a cosy menage a trois will enable Britain to become a permanent agenda-setting partner in the EU as it is transformed beyond recognition into a club of 25. The new "trilateralism" looks like an attempt to grab the helm when the ship, already badly in need of an overhaul, is dangerously overcrowded and in danger of drifting in uncharted waters.
The three have plenty on their plates. The Berlin menu includes a declaration on economic and social security reform, labor market flexibility and innovation that is intended to move things along at next month's full summit in Brussels. Plans to make Europe the most dynamic economy in the world by 2010 certainly need more than fine words. Other hot topics include: should Turkey finally be invited to start accession talks; what about those stalled constitutional negotiations; and who will replace Romano Prodi at the European Commission?
Reactions to the summit range from the irritated to the indifferent. The uninvited Italians went into a pre-emptive, comic-opera sulk, warning darkly of the dangers of a "directoire." Spanish Prime Minister Jose Maria Aznar muttered about being relegated to the "children's table." But the Poles -- whose relations with France and Germany are frosty these days -- like the idea of Britain's Atlanticist input.
Europe's small countries do have grounds for concern: if the big three run the show, the commission's role as guardian of the general interest is inevitably weakened. It is, after all, only weeks since Paris and Berlin, backed by British Chancellor Gordon Brown, humiliated Prodi by ripping up the eurozone's stability pact deficit rulebook. The three agree with the other rich member states on the need to cut the next EU budget. And Javier Solana's attempts to forge a common foreign policy -- appreciated by the Irish, Danes and Austrians -- looked ridiculous when British Foreign Minister Jack Straw and his French and German counterparts, Dominique de Villepin and Joschka Fischer, flew to Tehran to talk about nuclear inspections without even bothering to tell him.
It happens in any relationship: the partners want different things. There is already anxiety in London about a "mismatch" of expectations, with an impatient Blair looking for action on economic reform while Chirac and Schroder hanker after the sort of emotional bond that has been waning since Helmut Kohl and Francois Mitterrand were in charge. It sounds like a bad, if familiar, case of practical Brits versus visionary continentals. "We want policy," complains one Whitehall insider, "they want commitment. They want us to sign in blood and then look at the agenda." And as the eurozone and the Schengen passport-free zone are still distant lands, Britain might be better off sticking to the ad hoc, issues-based European alliances it has deftly and promiscuously constructed in recent years. But it will always be hard to steer the ship while sitting firmly on the fence.
Confirming this point, Blair has no plans for changing tack on the constitution, while Germany and France are keen to nail down the double-majority voting system so opposed by the Blair's stroppy Spanish and Polish allies. Until that crisis is resolved, dynamic new leadership -- trilateral or otherwise -- is unlikely to take Europe very far.
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