President Chen Shui-bian (
In this election, Chen obviously has the initiative in terms of cross-strait relations. He has repeatedly explained to China and the international community Taiwan's wishes and the blueprint for its status in the cross-strait relationship. China may not accept that framework and blueprint in their entirety. If it rejects them, it can come up with a stance of its own. The two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seek a mutually acceptable consensus in these exchanges. Of course, direct negotiation -- not hollering at each other from afar -- is the best approach.
Chen's cross-strait policy does not follow the self-limitations imposed by the former Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) government which, faced with China's military threats, took its cue from Beijing and constrained itself inside a small circle, waiting for an opportunity for the Republic of China to retake "the mainland" and pinning its hopes on some dramatic political change there. Chen is not blindly waiting for the distant possibility of unification, China's democratization, or the baptism of a new Chinese leadership willing to implement democratic reforms.
Due to their traditional passive cross-strait policies, the KMT and the People First Party (PFP) can only chant the slogan "maintain the status quo," which of course means accepting China's missile threat and military intimidation as permissible.
China has been pointing missiles at Taiwan for over 50 years, Taipei City Mayor Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) said, asking if that meant we must hold a referendum on the missiles every year. Why does Ma rush to the defense of a status quo that includes the possibility of 500 missiles raining down on Taiwan? Why do the KMT and the PFP believe that Taiwan should be held hostage by Beijing's tyranical despots?
Referendums are a manifestation of the collective will of the people. China will not remove its missiles because of a referendum in Taiwan. What the pan-blues really fear is giving up their power, and this is why they are trying to stop the referendum. They are so afraid of the people expressing their will that they view any expression of the people's will as a threat. It would appear they have inherited the reactionary genes of Chinese imperial politics. It is no wonder that the two parties echo China's stance on the referendum issue.
Half a century of hostility and diplomatic tussles between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait is a historical tragedy that resulted from the Chinese Civil War. Antagonism to China is not something chosen by the people of Taiwan. People on both sides should forget the KMT-Chinese Communist Party dispute and the hatred generated over the past 50 years. They should try to get to know each other and build a new relationship.
Neither "one China" nor "unification" is a persuasive policy. It is more practical for the two sides to interact with each other on the basis of equality and mutual benefit. We hope the Chinese leadership can come out of their "great unification" ideological cocoon and accept the reality of Taiwan's independent existence. The leaders of the two sides should seek a creative framework for bilateral relations.
Taiwan stands at the epicenter of a seismic shift that will determine the Indo-Pacific’s future security architecture. Whether deterrence prevails or collapses will reverberate far beyond the Taiwan Strait, fundamentally reshaping global power dynamics. The stakes could not be higher. Today, Taipei confronts an unprecedented convergence of threats from an increasingly muscular China that has intensified its multidimensional pressure campaign. Beijing’s strategy is comprehensive: military intimidation, diplomatic isolation, economic coercion, and sophisticated influence operations designed to fracture Taiwan’s democratic society from within. This challenge is magnified by Taiwan’s internal political divisions, which extend to fundamental questions about the island’s identity and future
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