The road to the nation's first ever referendum has been bumpy. International anxiety over President Chen Shui-bian's (
The referendum issue is legally controversial, but it is ultimately a political struggle. The pan-blue camp plans to oppose the ruling party by three means -- asking for an interpretation of the Constitution from the Council of Grand Justices, mobilizing the cities and counties run by pan-blue leaders to resist taking part in the referendum and encouraging voters to reject the referendum ballots. An interpretation of the Constitution is certainly a proper way to resolve the dispute over a defensive referendum. But by the time an interpretation is issued, the election will have long been a fait accompli.
Cities and counties run by pan-blue leaders may be able to paralyze the referendum proceedings by refusing to cooperate. But it will be illegal for the cities and counties to resist a legal order issued by the president in accordance with Article 17 of the Referendum Law (
The pan-blue camp's most likely approach would be to separate the presidential election from the referendum administratively and call on the public to refuse to vote in the referendum. This may reduce both the turnout rate and the political association between the referendum and the election, thereby minimizing the points Chen could gain from the referendum and minimizing the pan-blue camp's loss.
Whether Chen's handling of the referendum issue meets the criteria set in Article 17 of the law -- when the nation comes under external threats and is in danger of a sovereignty change -- is up to his political judgment. The voters will decide how to answer that question; the political parties should not overstep their responsibility and answer it for them.
The KMT continues to exercise an authoritarian decision-making model. It still wants to have a small group of people make decisions for the majority. This is a democratically regressive approach. The referendum plan is a rather daring and risky political decision, but it is also a smart strategy compatible with a state leader's handling of the nation's international predicament and China's threats.
If a head of state does not have the ability and determination to resolve a predicament facing the country, the people certainly will not entrust him or her with governance. Chen first attracted international attention by raising the referendum issue and then gained international acceptance by presenting the carefully worded referendum questions. He has demonstrate his ability to run the country.
Taiwan is not a normal country. It has limited national international status and its people have no dignity in the international community. These are key factors affecting the nation's ability to join the international community. Both presidential candidates should see the big picture of Taiwan's plight and propose solutions. This will be a key factor determining voter behavior and cannot be ignored.
Taiwan is still facing China's military threats. It must maintain a status of independence and self-determination in the changing international situation. Only then can Taipei negotiate peacefully and engage in exchanges with Beijing on an equal basis. The question of which presidential candidate can stand firm on national sovereignty issues, trust the people and defend Taiwan's interests is a question that voters cannot ignore.
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