The US does not understand Taiwan's proposed referendum. It only worries that through the referendum, Taiwan will go out of control and change the "status quo" in cross-strait relations. Washington is concerned that this will affect regional security and its interests and perhaps involve it in a conflict with China.
Military confrontation with China is the last thing that the US wants.
Therefore, Washington opposes Taiwan's proposed defensive referendum -- which asks China to dismantle its missiles targeting the nation -- because by holding a referendum Taipei might unilaterally change the status quo.
A defensive referendum is provided for in the Referendum Law (
However, if our move to hold a referendum will drastically change the status quo, challenge or provoke China and create regional instability, the US' concern, lack of support or even opposition is understandable and acceptable from an ally.
But provided that this is neither what the referendum is meant to be nor what its outcome will be, then the dissent expressed by our ally may show its misunderstanding, or lack of understanding, of us.
This lack of understanding may partly be our fault.
Indeed, President Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) has not clarified the content and specific wording of the referendum. He has only pointed out two issues: one, China should dismantle the nearly 500 missiles aimed at Taiwan; and two, China should give up making military threats against Taiwan.
China, in view of these demands upon it, apparently suffered from a guilty conscience and reacted by complaining to the US.
Seeing the premise of the referendum, which involves changing the military situation across the Taiwan Strait, and the strong opposition of China, the US misunderstood Taiwan's position as one of intentionally provoking China, unilaterally changing the status quo and pursuing independence and a change to the country's name and flag.
In complaining to the US, Beijing admitted that cross-strait relations are not a domestic issue but instead an international problem.
Otherwise, it would not have had to complain to the US, Japan, the EU and ASEAN.
This unexpected consequence was not necessarily bad for Taiwan. We have finally let the world know that non-democratic China has never given up its attempts to annex democratic Taiwan. The US, Japan, the EU and the ASEAN countries have now seen and heard this. Their concern about the issue reflects the tensions between their practical diplomatic interests and their support for democratic ideals.
So that these countries do not misunderstand Taiwan and thereby make misjudgments in their policies, it is time for Chen to emphasize the second part of the concept of the referendum -- that is, the referendum is in its essence about peace. It is my understanding that Chen, together with the Presidential Office and National Security Council, have been working toward this.
When Chen saw that Article 17 of the Referendum Law entitled him to initiate a defensive referendum to consolidate the national will, he must have started thinking of ways to go about doing that.
Dismantling its missiles and giving up its military threats are passive measures that we hope China will adopt. But we have to develop positive policies to reach the goal of peace across the Strait.
Here are two ideas for the specific content of the referendum on peace:
One: For lasting peace across the Taiwan Strait, we demand that China dismantle its nearly 500 missiles that are aimed at Taiwan. Once China makes this show of goodwill, our government should actively carry out negotiations with Beijing on the issue of the three links in a peaceful, equal and dignified way.
Two: For lasting peace across the Taiwan Strait, we demand that China publicly renounce the use of military force against Taiwan. Once China makes this show of goodwill, our government should carry out negotiations with Beijing regarding cross-strait relations in a peaceful, equal and dignified way.
I would like to ask the people of Taiwan: Would you agree with the peace proposals in the referendum and trust the government to implement them? I would like to ask the leaders of the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the People First Party: Do you still think such peace policies will endanger Taiwan?
And I would like to ask the US president and Japan's prime minister: Will you oppose such a proposal seeking cross-strait peace?
Michael Hsiao is executive director of the Center for Asia-Pacific Area Studies at Academia Sinica.
Translated by Jennie Shih
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