US-Taiwan relations have never been better, but increased security cooperation is creating tensions and eroding trust on both sides.
Washington has made no secret of its desire to help Taiwan consolidate democracy and protect itself from a possible Chinese military effort to reclaim the island. Yet turning that desire into practical policies to enhance Taiwan's security is proving to be very difficult.
When China fired ballistic missiles to influence Taiwan's 1996 presidential election, then president Bill Clinton deployed two aircraft carriers as a tangible symbol of US commitment to Taiwan's defense. However, critics charge that the Clinton administration refused to sell Taiwan the advanced weapons it needed and that "strategic ambiguity" about the conditions under which the US would intervene on Taiwan's behalf weakened deterrence of a Chinese military attack.
US President George W. Bush's administration moved quickly to address both of these perceived shortcomings. The administration approved sales of a number of advanced weapons systems to Taipei, including Kidd class destroyers, Patriot PAC-3 anti-ballistic missile interceptors, P-3 anti-submarine warfare aircraft and diesel submarines. The process of reviewing future arms sales requests was revised to facilitate quicker approval. Most importantly, Bush declared that the US would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan defend itself.
So why doesn't Taiwan feel secure? Bush administration efforts to help defend Taiwan have produced some unintended consequences and left some important issues unaddressed.
Reduced ambiguity and stronger US support have caused military modernization to slow down in Taiwan and to speed up in China. The Legislative Yuan has been reluctant to fund purchase of the weapons the Bush admin-istration approved for sale in April 2001, citing budget constraints and a desire for domestic production. Taiwan's defense budget has been declining since 1996, and the period of conscription for draftees was just cut to only one year of service. Some in Washington question the depth of Taiwan's commitment to its own defense and ask whether Taipei is attempting to shift its defense burden onto Washington's shoulders.
While Taiwan's military modernization has stalled, China has been improving its capability to deter or defeat American forces in a military conflict in the Taiwan Strait. China's continuing buildup of short-range ballistic missiles along with recent and planned purchases of advanced Russian weapons systems such as Sovremenny-class destroyers and Kilo-class submarines demonstrate Chinese efforts to acquire military capabilities that will complicate US efforts to intervene on Taiwan's behalf.
A less publicized change involves increased military inter-actions between the US and Taiwan. These encompass training, intelligence sharing, observing military exercises and discussing possible military responses in the event of a Chi-nese attack. However, the two sides have different objectives and expectations for security cooperation. Taipei prefers exchanges that involve high-level officials and are public symbols of the US security commitment. The US prefers quiet, lower level ex-changes that address practical issues and focus on improving Taiwan's military capabilities. Differing expectations have created frustrations on both sides.
China's economic growth is also exerting a powerful pull on Taiwan and giving Beijing new sources of influence. Taiwan's leaders have tried to set limits on trade and investment to avoid excessive dependence on China, but economic integration has continued to deepen. Although Taipei is concerned about the "hollowing out" of Taiwan's economy and the long-term impact of economic dependence, it has been unable to formulate a coherent response. (One recent proposal, a free-trade agreement between the US and Taiwan, is unlikely to succeed.) Military cooperation with the US has little relevance to a more sophisticated Chinese strategy of encouraging political forces on Taiwan that might one day support unification.
A final concern is the relative importance of China and Taiwan to the US over the long-term. The US has important stakes in Tai-wan, including defending democracy and the credibility of US security commitments in the region. However, some in Taipei question whether these will continue to outweigh Washington's economic and security interests in China. Some fear that the US will ultimately abandon Taiwan in order to maintain good relations with China. These concerns have intensified as Beijing's cooperation in the war on terror and role in seeking to resolve the North Korean nuclear crisis have become more prominent. Recent statements that the US opposes Taiwan's independence and US pressure on Taipei to refrain from statements and actions that might provoke Beijing have reinforced these concerns.
As the Pentagon's latest report on Chinese military power illustrates, Beijing is actively working to develop the military capabilities necessary to determine Taiwan's future. Advanced arms sales, expanding unofficial security ties and a clearer US security commitment have not solved Taiwan's security problems. Indeed, US efforts to enhance security cooperation are exposing underlying tensions in relations between Taipei and Washington. US military power can play an important role in maintaining stability across the Taiwan Strait, but military measures cannot solve the problem. At the end of the day, Tai-wan's status is a political dispute that requires a political solution.
Phillip Saunders is director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the Monterey Institute's Center for Nonproliferation Studies. Jennifer Bulkeley spent the last year as an NSEP Boren graduate fellow in Taiwan and will return to Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School in the fall.
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