Mon, Aug 04, 2025 page3

• Energy ‘weakest element’ in Taiwan resilience: CSIS

  • By Jonathan Chin / Staff writer, with CNA
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  The energy sector is the “weakest element” in Taiwan’s potential to resist coercion, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) think tank said in a report after conducting a series of war games.

  “The overwhelming preponderance of [Taiwan’s] energy must be imported and is thus vulnerable to a blockade,” it wrote in a report dated Thursday.

  Although blockading Taiwan to paralyze its energy supply would be risky and costly, that could reduce the nation’s electricity generation to 20 percent of its regular levels, it said.

  

  CPC Corp, Taiwan’s liquefied natural gas import terminal in Kaohsiung’s Yungan port is pictured in an undated photograph.

  Photo courtesy of CPC Corp, Taiwan

  This would spell paralysis for Taiwan’s manufacturing sector, including for chips that supply the world economy, the CSIS said.

  Russia has conducted a similar strategy in its attack on Ukraine’s energy grid, with some success, it added.

  The think tank’s conclusions were drawn from 26 simulations of a Chinese blockade on Taiwan, which they said was an attractive option for Beijing.

  A blockade could help China pressure Taiwan into capitulating to annexation without risking a bloody and dangerous amphibious assault on Taiwan proper, the CSIS said.

  Beijing’s blockade could range from deploying its coast guard to board and inspect vessels, to a full-scale conflict where it launches missile strikes against US and Japanese military bases, it said.

  The outcome could be influenced by factors including Taiwan’s ability to bolster its infrastructure, investment in defenses against an invasion, the size of the Taiwanese merchant marine fleet, the lethality of Chinese missiles, Japan’s willingness to assist Taiwan and the potential of the war spreading outside the blockade zone, the CSIS said.

  A blockade would pose a severe, but not insurmountable challenge, it said, adding that the most important capability for Taiwan and the US was being able to hire or requisition a vast merchant fleet to supply Taiwan.

  Other key capabilities include increasing the number of gas carriers in its possession, replacing insurance companies that are unwilling cover commercial shipping in war zones and energy resilience, the CSIS said.

  Taiwan could reduce its dependence on energy imports by building strategic reserves of oil, gas and coal, and maintaining the nation’s last nuclear reactor, it said, adding that the nation’s energy grid should be hardened by measures such as having stockpiles of transformer and turbine spare parts.

  The nation would also need a broad set of military capabilities to defend itself, as the weapon systems suited for a “porcupine strategy” against a full-scale invasion would not be useful against a blockade, which requires ships and warplanes, it said.

  Taiwan and the US should prepare a “creative menu of offers and responses ahead of time,” as off-ramps for Beijing to declare victory without extracting substantial concessions, the CSIS said, adding that those could include Taiwan agreeing to international observers in customs houses or reiterating the so-called “1992 consensus.”

  The “1992 consensus” is a term former Mainland Affairs Council chairman Su Chi (蘇起) in 2006 admitted making up in 2000. It refers to a tacit understanding between the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) and the Chinese government that both sides of the Strait acknowledge there is “one China,” with each side having its own interpretation of what “China” means.
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