Sat, Aug 16, 2025 page12

• Donovan’s Deep Dives: Ko Wen-je, the KMT’s prickly ally

  The jailed former chairman wanted the TPP to serve as a pan-blue alternative to the KMT, while retaining enough of a distinct identity to appeal to moderate and independent voters

  • By Courtney Donovan Smith 石東文 / Staff Columnist
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  Has the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP) changed under the leadership of Huang Kuo-chang (黃國昌)?

  In tone and messaging, it obviously has, but this is largely driven by events over the past year. How much is surface noise, and how much is substance?

  How differently party founder Ko Wen-je (柯文哲) would have handled these events is impossible to determine because the biggest event was Ko’s own arrest on multiple corruption charges and being jailed incommunicado.

  

  From left: Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) Chairman Eric Chu, New Taipei City Mayor and then-KMT presidential candidate Hou You-yi, former president Ma Ying-jeou and former Taiwan People’s Party chairman Ko Wen-je join hands in solidarity in the lead up to last years presidential election.

  Photo: TT file photo

  To understand the similarities and differences that may be evolving in the Huang era, we must first understand Ko’s TPP.

  ELECTORAL STRATEGY

  The party’s strategy under Ko was clear: Build a pan-blue alternative to the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) that could draw on their supporters, while retaining enough of a distinct identity to appeal to moderate and independent voters that dislike the two major parties.

  

  Former Taiwan People’s Party chairman Ko Wen-je on Thursday is led into the Taipei District Court.

  Photo: Liao Chen-huei, Taipei Times

  Electorally, this is a sound strategy. In a series of surveys from 2022, KMT voters throughout most of the country were more likely to support them because they “hate the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),” while DPP voters were more likely to pick “just because I like the DPP.” KMT supporters are more up for grabs than DPP voters if given a non-DPP alternative, and the DPP has for years been ranked the most popular political party.

  There are blue-leaning districts that have proven time and again they will choose non-KMT candidates — even if they are pan-green ideologically — as long as they are not branded with the hated DPP label. Ko won two terms as Taipei mayor on this math.

  At the beginning of his political career, Ko considered joining the DPP, but instead chose to chart an independent path, though he railed against the KMT. Once the DPP became the ruling party, he increasingly targeted them with his ire.

  

  While the previous Taiwan People’s Party chairman, Ko Wen-je, kept the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) at arms length, the party under Huang Kuo-chang has fully embraced his pan-blue ally. Huang, center, is pictured here on Thursday with KMT Chairman Eric Chu, second left, and surrounded by KMT supporters.

  Photo: Lee Hui-chou, Taipei Times

  He did not entirely abandon attracting some pan-green support, but openly allied with the KMT to oust the DPP from power. During his presidential run he described the DPP as a party that had lost its early ideals, and frequently blamed the DPP’s New Tide faction for leading the party astray.

  Ko’s TPP ran on the slogan “rational, pragmatic, scientific” and mocked the antics of KMT lawmakers throwing pig guts on the floor of the legislature as “clowns.” The 2020-2024 TPP caucus did not conspicuously ally with the KMT at the time.

  In the run-up to the national election last year, the KMT and TPP flirted, but both sides were suspicious, and only cooperated in limited ways, most notably in Taichung’s first electoral district, where the KMT knew they had no hope.

  Their efforts to form a joint presidential ticket collapsed spectacularly on public television. During this period, Ko openly fretted about being “swallowed up” by the KMT and was concerned that his party could go the way of the People’s First Party (PFP).

  Acutely aware his party lacked the size, experience, professionalism and star politicians to compete with the two major parties, Ko and the TPP worked effectively with what they had.

  Their online marketing was highly effective, maximizing impact for a fraction of the cost. It was especially effective at attracting younger voters fed up with eight years of DPP rule. Their concerns over stagnant wages, spiraling housing prices and desire for change gave the TPP a boost.

  These younger supporters formed a “little sprouts” movement of dedicated Ko supporters during the presidential run. This emphasis on younger voters was good electoral politics, as older voters were more likely stuck in their ways and less willing to switch parties. Support was strong among voters under age 50, but cratered precipitously above that age.

  To maximize party talent, Ko laid out a two-year, local focus requirement for all lawmakers elected on the proportional representation party list. This stipulated that the lawmakers step down after two years, with the next in line on the party list stepping up to replace them.

  This cleverly created the potential to cultivate twice as many political stars over four years. Each lawmaker was also assigned a geographical region of responsibility to cultivate ties and to ideally position them for future runs for local office.

  Unlike the PFP, the TPP has the advantage that it is not a KMT breakaway party. Most of their talent has been developed internally, and the defections from other parties have been on an individual basis, not a movement en masse.

  This makes it harder — though not impossible — for the KMT to poach TPP talent and absorb the party. One of the reasons Ko gave for being skeptical of creating a joint presidential ticket — despite his strong desire to take down the DPP — was that the TPP and KMT “had different DNA.”

  IDEOLOGICAL INCOHERENCE

  While Ko’s TPP was effective and clever in their electoral strategy, beyond the message of not being the DPP or KMT, they had little to offer.

  Ideologically, the party was feeble.

  Under “core philosophy” on their Web site they list “democracy,” “freedom,” “diversity,” “open-mindedness,” “nomocracy,” “human rights,” “caring for the vulnerable” and “sustainability.”

  In each category they have a mere one-sentence explanation, and other than “nomocracy,” it is all boilerplate “of course” values that all major parties espouse.

  The choice of “nomocracy” is interesting, and according to Google AI “emphasizes the impartial and consistent application of laws, whereas democracy focuses on popular participation and representation.” However, they never emphasized this concept, and their first “core philosophy” on their Web site under “democracy” they state “an open government and full public participation are our goals,” which is somewhat contradictory.

  Notice some things missing from that list? There is nothing about relations with China, defense or foreign relations.

  Ko has been fairly consistent on defense. He called for increased defense spending above three percent of GDP, considered increasing conscription beyond one year, and said “our stance is that we should prepare for war so that we will not be afraid of one.”

  Though generally positive on ties with Washington, he accused Beijing of pushing Taiwan towards the US.

  It is on relations with China were he was most inconsistent. Before the election, he said the DPP is too “pro-war” in dealing with Beijing, while the KMT is “too deferential.”

  In a dig at the KMT, he billed the party as being “pro-Taiwan,” and almost always referred to “Taiwan” and almost never used “Republic of China.”

  Mostly, he sounded light blue, promising to engage in dialogue to “reduce enmity” and vowed not to “provoke” Beijing. Regarding political unification, he said: “at this stage, ‘one China’ is impossible.” Notice that it does not rule it out eventually, just “at this stage.”

  He said the TPP could not support the unpopular “1992 consensus” because “there is no market for it,” but repeatedly expressed hope for another formula to replace it. He tried using “both sides of the Taiwan Strait are one family,” but had to back away from that after public outcry.

  At one point, he considered supporting a services pact with China — which the Sunflower movement of which he was apart arose to block — before finally backing away.

  There is some evidence Ko used a deep blue intermediary to secure Beijing’s tacit approval to run for president and raise money from a pan-blue supporter. See “Ko Wen-je, KMT conspiracy and the most dangerous man in the world,” March 12, page 12.

  Ko’s TPP was allied with the KMT, but it was a prickly relationship.

  Then, starting in the spring, the TPP legislative caucus appeared to march in lockstep with the KMT, playing down their legislative disagreements and publicly doubling down on their alliance. Like the PFP, they became firmly part of the pan-blue bloc.

  The TPP caucus convener is Huang Kuo-chang, and he appeared to be spearheading the new strategy.

  Our next column examines the Huang era.

  Donovan’s Deep Dives is a regular column by Courtney Donovan Smith (石東文) who writes in-depth analysis on everything about Taiwan’s political scene and geopolitics. Donovan is also the central Taiwan correspondent at ICRT FM100 Radio News, co-publisher of Compass Magazine, co-founder Taiwan Report (report.tw) and former chair of the Taichung American Chamber of Commerce. Follow him on X: @donovan_smith.
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