No one saw it coming.
Everyone — including the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) — expected at least some of the recall campaigns against 24 of its lawmakers and Hsinchu Mayor Ann Kao (高虹安) to succeed. Underground gamblers reportedly expected between five and eight lawmakers to lose their jobs.
All of this analysis made sense, but contained a fatal flaw. The record of the recall campaigns, the collapse of the KMT-led recalls, and polling data all pointed to enthusiastic high turnout in support of the recall campaigns, and that those against the recalls were unenthusiastic and far less likely to vote.
Photo: Chen Yi-kuan, Taipei Times
That data painted what was likely a reasonably accurate picture in the period from late June through early July before the legally mandated polling blackout was enforced.
The final voting results were very different in two ways.
In the final weeks, there was a huge surge in support for opposing the recalls, and enthusiasm waned among recall supporters outside of their core base.
The key questions are what changed, and why?
EXPLANATIONS MISSING THE MARK
Before examining the most likely answers to those questions, there are many takes being floated that need to be examined.
One explanation is that this shows the impressive power of the KMT’s get-out-the-vote political machine. As this column stated on Thursday: “never discount the effectiveness and professionalism of the KMT.” It is very real.
It no doubt helped. In rural areas dominated by KMT patronage factions like Hualien and the Yunlin 1 districts, they potentially moved the needle by double digits. In more urban areas — which accounted for almost all of the recall votes — this may have given them a boost of a few percentage points.
However, it was not a major factor. The “disagree” votes outnumbered the “agree” recall votes by vast margins. Only the Yeh Yuan-chih (葉元之) race in New Taipei 7 was close enough for it to potentially have been relevant.
Nor was the unexpectedly good weather a factor. Bad weather deters apathetic voters, but does not impact those determined to make their voice heard, which in this case was deafeningly loud.
Some claimed “China fearmongering” is not as effective a message as it used to be. This is true when compared to the 2020 election, but the recall exactly preserved the legislative balance of the election last year, suggesting it was not significantly more or less effective than last year.
It is the same with “Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) voter fatigue” at having the same party in power for so long. The result is the same as last year.
Others claim this was a victory by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) influence and propaganda campaigns. This exists and had some impact, but mostly influenced voters already inclined to hate the DPP, who would have turned out anyway.
It has also been suggested that voters care more about bread-and-butter issues like low incomes, high house prices and the price of eggs. This may be true, but irrelevant as it was not an issue in the recalls, and the parties’ stances are nearly indistinguishable.
Some suggest that the voters did not understand the nuance of the issues. That is a polite way of saying the voters are ignorant and/or stupid, which is extremely arrogant.
Taiwanese take democracy very seriously, and the number of news outlets in Taiwan is staggeringly high considering the population. Taiwanese voters are among the best — possibly the best — informed in any democracy.
They may not know every little detail and, depending on one’s personal political opinions, may disagree with their assessments, but they can be counted on to understand the issues at stake.
United Microelectronics Corporation founder Robert Tsao (曹興誠) — who campaigned and funded many of the recall efforts — pinned the blame on the DPP not doing enough to get out the vote.
As we shall see, I think the opposite is true; they should have done less.
WHAT CHANGED
At the end of last month, President and DPP party Chairman William Lai (賴清德) finally formally backed and encouraged the party to actively support the recalls.
That was a mistake.
When the recall campaigns began to take shape in December last year, aside from some individuals like Ker Chien-ming (柯建銘) personally expressing support, Lai ordered the party to keep their distance. Lai’s instincts were solid.
While over 30 different recall campaigns were building big momentum in the spring, the DPP continued to keep their distance, but held rallies and activities that did not expressly support the recalls, but indirectly underscored the recall campaigns’ main arguments. DPP politicians personally expressed their support, but it was not yet a party position.
By last month, Lai started his “unity” tour of speeches with a similar indirect approach. The first was effective, but they quickly went downhill and began to cause more harm than good.
Early this month, in response to Lai formally pushing the party to actively support the recalls, the party began offering the campaigns logistical support in helping book billboard space and other marketing.
They did not take control over or try to direct the recall campaigns, but party members and party volunteers flooded the streets.
This was a gift to the KMT. They had been trying to portray the recall campaigns as orchestrated by Lai and backed by the party.
Until the final weeks before the recall vote, the KMT’s claims fell flat. The Bluebird Movement-inspired and civil society-supported campaigns were clearly acting on their own.
Their campaigners and volunteers were normal people passionately committed to their cause and expressing their fears and concerns. They were neighbors, friends and friendly people from all walks of life.
They were amateurs learning as they went, and people could relate and respond to their passion. They rejected the KMT party-led recalls, but sympathized with these grassroots campaigners.
Then the DPP professionals, with their polished party line messaging, joined in.
This was what changed in the final weeks just before the recall votes took place, during the very period when voters were focusing the most on which side they were going to vote for.
What had been a David versus Goliath battle between people in the neighborhood versus the mighty KMT now had all the trappings of a partisan DPP versus KMT election.
The KMT’s case that this was a misuse of the intention of the recall laws by the DPP to overturn the results of the election last year now had more than a ring of truth to it.
This would explain why mainstream voters sympathetic to the recall campaigns in polling held in June and early July in the end showed up in lower numbers than expected.
It would also explain why so many previously largely apathetic “disagree” voters became energized to turn out en masse.
Moderate voters who tip elections do not like to feel they are being manipulated.
The clearest test of the will of this swing electorate was reflected in the results of the 2024 legislative party list proportional representation vote.
The DPP got the most votes, but the KMT came in a strong second, and neither won a majority. The balance of power was given to the smaller Taiwan People’s Party (TPP).
By re-electing the DPP to the presidency, the public indicated they trusted the party more on key big issues, including dealing with China and foreign policy. They trusted no party enough to give them control of the legislature outright, but a majority wanted the KMT and TPP combined to be able to exercise oversight over the ruling DPP administration.
The results of the recall sent a clear message that the results of the election last year were to be respected, and attempting to overturn them was unacceptable.
Those moderate swing voters won, not any political party.
Donovan’s Deep Dives is a regular column by Courtney Donovan Smith (石東文) who writes in-depth analysis on everything about Taiwan’s political scene and geopolitics. Donovan is also the central Taiwan correspondent at ICRT FM100 Radio News, co-publisher of Compass Magazine, co-founder Taiwan Report (report.tw) and former chair of the Taichung American Chamber of Commerce. Follow him on X: @donovan_smith.
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