When US President Donald Trump sits down for talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) this week, the focus would be on whether the world’s two-biggest powers can stabilize a fraught relationship. However, it is the countries caught in between that have been forced to navigate the fallout from the geopolitical storm. Their efforts to build networks of resilience offer a rare reason for quiet optimism — a silver-linings playbook for middle powers.
This is a coping strategy born of necessity, yet it is already reshaping the architecture of a fragile global system. By broadening partnerships and avoiding overdependence on any single power, these nations are reducing their exposure to Washington and Beijing.
Singapore and New Zealand offered a clear example of this last week, signing what they framed as the world’s first legally binding supply chain resilience pact to keep essentials — including food, fuel, healthcare products, and chemical and construction materials — flowing. The countries pledged to work together in times of crisis, Singaporean Prime Minister Lawrence Wong (黃循財) said, adding that they would “not shut each other out.”
Wong has been among the most outspoken leaders in Asia about the risks posed by Trump’s foreign and trade policies. After the US imposed sweeping tariffs last year, he warned they marked a seismic change in the global order, and the end of rules-based globalization and free trade. Singapore has also raised concerns about wider instability triggered by the US and Israel’s conflict with Iran and its impact on energy supplies. Asian economies are particularly exposed to higher fuel prices, with several forced to implement emergency measures.
Middle powers are moving on. Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi has emerged as the embodiment of this vibe. During visits to Vietnam and Australia, she struck deals on energy security, defense and critical minerals. She has also lobbied for closer ties with South Korea, setting aside historical tensions. India, Indonesia and Japan are deepening maritime coordination with naval exercises, while Australia and South Korea are strengthening ties on supply chain resilience.
The idea of middle powers working together is not new, but as Farwa Aamer and Emma Chanlett-Avery of the Asia Society Policy Institute argue in their report, “Seeking Agency in Uncertainty: Asian Middle Powers and the Fragmenting Global Order,” the difference in this era is the speed, coordination and strategic intent behind these moves. Countries are building what they describe as “shock absorbers” — overlapping economic, technological and security networks designed to ensure that no single disruption becomes a systemic crisis.
None of this means middle powers can replace the superpowers. The US remains the world’s largest economy and the primary security guarantor for allies including Japan, South Korea and the Philippines, as well as the key security backer for Taiwan. China, meanwhile, is the dominant trading partner for much of the Indo-Pacific region. However, both powers are increasingly seen as unpredictable, and middle powers can no longer afford to rely on either alone.
The direction of travel is clear — these countries are choosing each other, at least for now. Building more legally binding supply chain agreements, such as the Singapore-New Zealand pact, would be a smart move. Expanding coordination around specific problems like critical minerals, energy security, maritime safety and food supplies would also be prudent. The goal is not to isolate superpowers completely — that is unrealistic. Instead, it is to carve out a path to create a system with options and agency.
The lesson is just as important for Washington. Partners and allies are not completely turning away from the US, but if it wants to remain central to the Indo-Pacific region, other nations cannot be treated as transactional add-ons. It needs to offer consistency, a predictable trade policy and credible security commitments, all in short supply in the current White House.
Every storm cloud might have a silver lining. In the shadow of superpower rivalry, middle powers are finding theirs.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades.This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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