At a time when uncertainty is growing in US-China relations — highlighted by the delay of a potential meeting between US President Donald Trump and Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) — political parties in Taiwan face increasing pressure to clarify their strategic positions.
Yet developments within the main opposition party, the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT), suggest that internal divisions continue to overshadow the search for a coherent political vision.
Disagreements are a normal part of democratic politics. However, when a political party handles those disagreements through exclusion rather than debate, it risks weakening itself. What might appear as isolated disputes within the KMT reflects a broader pattern: Differing views are often treated as liabilities to be contained, rather than as opportunities for discussion.
This approach might create the appearance of unity, but it rarely produces real cohesion. When dissent is suppressed, divisions do not disappear — they deepen. This undermines a party’s ability to respond effectively to domestic and international challenges.
Part of the problem lies in the KMT’s unresolved historical identity. The party has long been associated with Taiwan’s economic development, but it is also linked to an authoritarian past. These competing narratives have never been fully reconciled into a consistent political identity. Instead, they are selectively emphasized depending on political circumstances, leaving the party without a sense of direction.
These tensions are closely tied to deeper disagreements over the party’s strategic orientation toward China. Figures within the KMT reflect competing approaches. Former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) has continued to emphasize the so-called “1992 consensus” as a basis for engagement with Beijing, while other voices within the party have signaled a more forward-leaning stance, at times framing cross-strait relations in terms that blur political and national identity.
Such differences are not limited to elite discourse. They are also reflected in a gap between the party’s central leadership and its local political networks, where electoral considerations often require a more cautious and pragmatic approach. Generational divides further complicate the picture, as younger voters tend to be more skeptical of closer alignment with China, while older supporters remain more receptive to traditional frameworks of engagement.
This lack of clarity carries increasing costs. As strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region intensifies, political parties are expected to articulate clear and forward-looking positions, particularly on cross-strait relations. Without such a framework, internal disagreements are more likely to escalate into factional conflict.
The consequences are especially visible among younger voters. A political party that cannot clearly explain what it stands for will struggle to build trust with a new generation. Criticism of the ruling party is no substitute for presenting a credible alternative.
The challenge facing the KMT is not simply about managing internal disputes: It is about rebuilding a sense of direction. A party’s strength lies not in eliminating differences, but in its ability to transform those differences into meaningful debate and policy development.
If competition can be channeled into constructive discussion, it might help the party adapt and regain public confidence. If not, even well-planned electoral strategies might prove insufficient.
In politics, unity imposed from above rarely endures. Only unity grounded in shared ideas can last.
Leonard Fong-sheng Wang is an honorary chair professor at National University of Kaohsiung.
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