Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi on Friday last week announced the dissolution of the Japanese House of Representatives. Many commentators have said the move is a sign of a shaky governing base. That reading risks missing the deeper strategic logic behind the decision. This is not only a calculation about political survival, it is a political response to pressure from China.
Institutionally, Takaichi could have continued governing until October 2028 without dissolving the Japanese Diet. Yet the ruling coalition of the Liberal Democratic Party and the Japan Innovation Party holds only a razor-thin majority. For routine governance, such an arrangement might suffice, but for major decisions involving national security, fiscal policy and foreign strategy, it represents chronic uncertainty. A government facing sustained external pressure cannot function effectively without the capacity for rapid decisionmaking and internal cohesion.
What truly forces Takaichi to roll the dice is China. Beijing’s diplomatic accusations, public opinion pressure and the instrumentalization of economic tools against Japan have increasingly taken on a long-term character.
That said, the “China factor” is not determinative in itself. Japan’s willingness to withstand pressure — particularly on Taiwan-related or security issues — has historically depended on two fundamental conditions.
First is the level of political resolve embodied by the prime minister. Leaders such as former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe and Takaichi have demonstrated a greater willingness to assume risk in China policy than more cautious figures such as former Japanese prime ministers Fumio Kishida or Shigeru Ishiba.
Second is whether the strategic benefits of a given policy clearly outweighs the cost of Chinese retaliation. When the answer is yes, Japan’s political system would ultimately choose to push forward with the policy rather than constrain itself in response to external pressure.
This could be why Takaichi has placed such emphasis on the re-examination of Japan’s key national security policies. The objective is not mere military expansion, but a reinterpretation of flexibility within Japan’s Three Non-Nuclear Principles, which say that Japan “shall neither possess nor manufacture nuclear weapons, nor shall it permit their introduction into Japanese territory.”
By doing so, Japan could allow US nuclear-powered submarines and other strategic platforms to deliver real deterrence, without formally contravening established policy.
According to the Yomiuri Shimbun, Takaichi said that winning an election would strengthen her leadership and “create favorable conditions for long-term dialogue with China.”
The remark captures her strategic worldview: Peace rests on strength, and strength derives not only from military posture, but from the depth of domestic political authorization.
When Taiwan amended the Constitution in 1997, the cross-party consensus aimed to bolster the democratic legitimacy of the presidency, enabling national leaders to shoulder external pressure with firm public backing. What might not have been anticipated was the risk of parliamentary dysfunction and the absence of a constitutional mechanism to dissolve the legislature.
Japan equips its prime minister with the constitutional authority to dissolve parliament and appeal directly to the electorate. In today’s high-risk international environment, does Taiwan’s constitutional design possess sufficient resilience to truly make public opinion a source of power for resolving deadlocks and driving reform?
Wang Hung-jen is a professor at National Cheng Kung University’s Department of Political Science and executive director of the Institute for National Policy Research.
Translated by Lin Lee-kai
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