Indian Ministry of External Affairs spokesman Randhir Jaiswal told a news conference on Jan. 9, in response to China’s latest round of live-fire exercises in the Taiwan Strait: “India has an abiding interest in peace and stability in the region, in view of our trade, economic, people-to-people and maritime interests. We urge all parties to exercise restraint, avoid unilateral actions and resolve issues peacefully without threat or use of force.”
The statement set a firm tone at the beginning of the year for India-Taiwan relations, and reflects New Delhi’s recognition of shared interests and the strategic importance of regional stability.
While India has issued comparable statements in the past, including after then-US House of Representatives speaker Nancy Pelosi’s visited Taiwan in August 2022 and China’s subsequent military drills, the latest articulation stands out for several reasons:
First, it underscores continuity in India’s position that stability in the Taiwan Strait can no longer be considered a distant concern, but rather one that directly affects its broader strategic environment. The Taiwan Strait is a critical maritime corridor for global trade and energy, and instability in it would have immediate consequences for India’s economic and security interests.
Second, by explicitly linking its position to trade, economic, people-to-people and maritime interests, India frames Taiwan’s security as a concrete strategic concern rather than an abstract principle. This reflects a pragmatic approach grounded in national interest.
Third, the call for restraint and peaceful resolution signals India’s desire to preserve a stable balance of power in the Indo-Pacific region amid a rapidly evolving and chaotic global order, positioning India as a cautious yet engaged stakeholder in Taiwan Strait security.
Fourth, the reference to “unilateral actions” allows India to convey its disapproval of Chinese behavior without overt confrontation. For India, the signaling is that coercive actions are unacceptable.
China’s conduct along the India-China border provides crucial context. Beijing has consistently sought to alter the “status quo” through incremental advances, cloaking coercive behavior in the language of stability and cooperation. China’s India policy has combined territorial consolidation, an expanded military presence, economic leverage and use of Pakistan as a proxy against India, while insisting that border dispute should not affect broader cooperation.
Diplomatic niceties have often masked increasingly assertive actions on the ground, with India repeatedly urged to exercise restraint, maintain distance from Taiwan and avoid deeper alignment with like-minded partners.
This pattern mirrors China’s approach in the Taiwan Strait, where pressure on Taiwan is persistent and carefully calibrated. In both theaters, the objective is to consolidate control while discouraging affected states from pursuing independent security choices and cooperating around convergent interests. Even though the theaters differ, the unilateral actions have imposed real costs on India and Taiwan.
India can no longer afford a diplomacy defined primarily by caution. Such an approach has not produced satisfactory outcomes in India-China relations. China has consistently demonstrated that restraint does not translate into concessions, whether on the border, through its proxy relationship with Pakistan or in wider regional affairs. Policymakers in New Delhi recognize that words alone are insufficient and that diplomatic signaling must be supported by strategic positioning. There is little evidence to suggest that China would change its behavior.
Against that backdrop, continued reluctance to engage Taiwan meaningfully runs counter to India’s own interests. India’s Taiwan policy remains unnecessarily constrained and, in many respects, self-defeating.
India has strategic interests and a clear economic rationale to engage Taiwan more deeply. It is in India’s interest to deter such a conflict and to urge China to maintain the “status quo.” Economically, the relevance of Taiwan for India has already been well established.
Crucially, New Delhi must stop viewing Taiwan solely through the prism of either the US or China. An independent and autonomous policy toward Taiwan would serve India well over the long term. If strategic autonomy is to have real meaning, it must also apply to its Taiwan policy.
This month’s statement reflects continuity and a growing recognition that India’s regional and economic interests, particularly regarding Taiwan, can no longer be addressed through rhetorical caution alone. Taiwan’s security is inseparable from India’s strategic environment and treating it as peripheral misreads the realities of Indo-Pacific interdependence. Safeguarding stability in the Taiwan Strait is not a matter of alignment or taking sides, but of advancing national interests through clarity, consistency and credible strategic engagement. Understood in this way, a more substantive engagement with Taiwan constitutes a necessary test of India’s professed commitment to strategic autonomy and multialignment.
Sana Hashmi is a fellow at the Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation. The views expressed here are personal.
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