I recently watched a panel discussion on Taiwan Talks in which the host rightly asked a critical question: Why is the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China (IPAC) spearheading a robust global movement to reject China’s ongoing distortion of UN Resolution 2758?
While the discussion offered some context, a more penetrating analysis and urgent development was missed. The IPAC action is not merely a political gesture; it is an essential legal and diplomatic countermeasure to China’s escalating and fundamentally baseless campaign to manufacture a claim over Taiwan through the deliberate misinterpretation of a 1971 UN resolution.
Since the inauguration of Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) as president in 2016, Taiwan has intensified its efforts for meaningful inclusion in global governance. The last time Taiwan attended the World Health Assembly (WHA) was in 2016 — an invitation narrowly secured just before Tsai took office on May 20 that year.
Since 2017, the strategic focus has been on participation in non-political, needs-based forums where “Taiwan can help”: primarily the WHO, but also the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) for air safety and Interpol for transnational crime.
Democratic nations and Taiwan’s diplomatic allies have offered staunch, unified support, recognizing Taiwan’s crucial democratic experience and contributions. This advocacy has often been spearheaded by national parliamentarians, whose work — driven by the tireless diplomacy of Taiwan’s government and the global diaspora — has effectively compelled their respective executives to press for Taiwan’s inclusion within these international bodies.
However, because the WHO is a UN specialized agency, Taiwan’s attempts to regain observer status are consistently met with institutional obstruction. UN administrative units, acting on Beijing’s direction, routinely invoke UN Resolution 2758. This obstruction is comprehensive, even extending to barring journalists holding Taiwanese passports from entering the UN headquarters.
Every year, key democracies and diplomatic allies champion Taiwan at the May WHA and the September UN General Assembly, arguing that no population — especially one with Taiwan’s experience combating infectious diseases like SARS and COVID-19 — should be excluded. While full inclusion remains elusive, the international momentum for support continues to build inexorably.
The urgency driving the IPAC response stems directly from three highly consequential and recent actions where China has explicitly conflated the “one China” principle with UN Resolution 2758 to directly erode Taiwan’s international standing.
First, expulsion from the Central American Parliament: On Aug. 21, 2023, Beijing orchestrated Nicaragua’s successful proposal to expel Taiwan (which had been a permanent observer since 1999) from the parliament and replace it with China. For the first time since 1971, this regional body explicitly cited UN Resolution 2758 and the “one China” principle to justify the expulsion — a calculated, dangerous precedent.
Second, Nauru’s diplomatic switch: Following the election of President William Lai (賴清德), China immediately poached Nauru on Jan. 15 last year. Crucially, the communique announcing the switch was the first of its kind to specifically cite UN Resolution 2758 alongside the “one China” principle.
Third, the downgrade of the office in South Africa: In March, the South African government unilaterally sought to downgrade Taiwan’s representation by changing the name of the Taipei Liaison Office to the Taipei Commercial Office and reclassifying it as an “international organization stationed in South Africa,” rather than as a separate entity. This action was accompanied by renewed demands that Taiwan vacate the administrative capital, Pretoria, citing UN Resolution 2758 and the “one China” principle.
These events confirm that Beijing is aggressively attempting to manufacture a false legal equivalence between the “one China” principle and UN Resolution 2758. This conflation is utterly without merit: UN Resolution 2758 solely addressed the question of Chinese representation in the UN; it is silent on Taiwan’s sovereignty and provides no endorsement of the “one China” principle.
IPAC’s initiative constitutes the most strategically important counterdevelopment in this context. On July 30 last year, the IPAC Annual Meeting in Taipei passed a resolution rejecting China’s distortion of UN Resolution 2758. This document is now the global legislative template.
Legislatures and inter-parliamentary bodies in the US, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Belgium, the UK, Australia, the EU, Canada and Sweden have subsequently passed resolutions aligning with the IPAC template, collectively refusing to accept Beijing’s manipulative interpretation.
However, a striking anomaly exists: While nine legislatures around the world have passed resolutions aligned with IPAC, the Legislative Yuan has yet to do so — an initial attempt by Democratic Progressive Party lawmakers in September last year was stalled due to the failure of the opposition to engage constructively. This urgency to address a global challenge that Taiwan’s own parliament has not yet fully embraced is precisely why I felt compelled to write.
The core issue is a focused defense of the international legal order. The most urgent priority is clear: Taiwan’s opposition majority bloc must end its obstruction and pass the IPAC-aligned resolution immediately. Globally, every democracy must join this legislative template to definitively reject China’s egregious distortion of UN Resolution 2758. The 1971 vote was unequivocally neither a vote for the “one China” principle, nor a mandate to determine Taiwan’s future. This distinction is fundamentally and strategically imperative.
Tseng Yueh-ying manages the Facebook page Translation Matters, which serves as a forum for discussions on language and Taiwanese politics.
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