The future of artificial intelligence (AI) depends on whether Taiwan and its allies — namely, the US — can secure the nation’s 15 international telecommunications cables and the broader global undersea cable system. Decades of deferred maintenance and deference to private actors have placed this critical infrastructure in a fragile position.
While China is literally parading its newest unmanned undersea vehicles (UUVs), the parties in the best position to increase the resiliency of the undersea cable system — the US and its hyperscalers — fail to see that a worst-case scenario is becoming increasingly likely.
The US, as a key supplier of undersea cable inputs and spare materials, could leverage its economic might to make these key resources more available. Hyperscalers such as Google and Meta are trying to lay new cables as fast as possible to keep up with their surge in bandwidth demands as they train new AI models. They can opt to make sure these cables are designed in a way to maximize resilience to new and growing threats.
Taiwan must not let this moment pass. There are signs of increased attention to this issue in Washington — I recently testified before Congress on this very topic. US representatives and senators alike are realizing that Taiwan and other allies are in a perilous position; they are also aware that their investments in AI would mean little if Internet traffic grinds to a halt due to undersea cable disruptions. A call for collaboration and immediate action from Taipei can ensure that Congress and US companies pursue this important issue.
Fifteen international cables ensure that Taiwan can reach the world and share its knowledge, products and services. These cables are prone to break even when they are not being targeted by adversaries. Misplaced fishing nets, anchors dropped at the wrong time and in the wrong place, and landslides can easily cause a cable break. This partially explains why dozens of cables have required repair over the past three years. As cables only have a lifespan of about 25 years, these breaks will likely become even more common in the near future. That is why across the entire undersea cable system there is a rush to lay new cables that are more resilient to everyday threats.
The time to repair these breaks is likely to increase. The global cable repair ship fleet is made up of fewer than 30 vessels — most of which need to be replaced by 2040. Experts calculate that US$3 billion is needed to meet this need. Google and Meta are each planning hundreds of billions of dollars in capital expenditure next year.
China, Russia and other bad actors are displaying new capabilities to clandestinely sabotage several undersea cables at once. As UUVs become more ubiquitous, the odds of bad actors being able to simultaneously snap several cables would increase. Taiwan, the US and allies would suffer significant economic and societal disruptions as a result.
Now is the time for Taiwanese officials to strongly and clearly express their support for US efforts to invest in the undersea cable system. These messages can then kick-start more specific joint initiatives. Taiwanese and US officials could help develop key standards around cybersecurity standards, cable repair processes and cable laying strategies that have been absent for far too long. They can also issue clear statements about how to interpret vague international laws in a way that aligns with the ability of every state to defend and protect its critical infrastructure, including undersea cables.
Ensuring the resilience of Taiwan’s undersea cables is not just a logistical necessity for the nation, but the fundamental prerequisite for safeguarding the global digital economy and the democratic connectivity that underpins the future of AI.
Kevin Frazier is the AI Innovation and Law Fellow at the University of Texas School of Law.
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