A troubling pattern has emerged in Northeast Asia. With Japan-China relations at their lowest point since diplomatic ties were established in 1972, Beijing is seeking to unsettle the region’s democratic alignment as a countermeasure.
In response to Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi’s recent remark that a Chinese strike on Taiwan would endanger Japan’s survival, Beijing has intensified efforts to reopen old cracks between South Korea and Japan. The tactics are noticeably sharper, aimed at breaking the momentum behind the Seoul-Tokyo-Washington trilateral partnership, which is a vital force for safeguarding peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.
At a news conference on Monday last week, Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesperson Mao Ning (毛寧) voiced support for South Korea’s sovereignty over the Seoul-administered Dokdo Rocks — known as Takeshima in Japan.
“Many of Japan’s recent egregious moves and remarks have aroused vigilance, dissatisfaction and protest from neighboring countries,” Mao added.
For years, Beijing did not seem to care about such a dispute, but is now making noise about the issue between South Korea and Japan. The timing is no coincidence: Japan is deepening its security debate over Taiwan. This was not a diplomatic courtesy to South Korea. It was a cheap diplomatic shot designed to drive a wedge between two of East Asia’s democracies.
Japan-China relations are currently strained, and Beijing has its own territorial dispute with Tokyo over the Senkaku Islands — known as the Diaoyutai Islands (釣魚台) in Taiwan. By injecting itself into the Dokdo issue, Beijing seeks to pull Seoul into its confrontation with Tokyo.
China knows that any flare-up over Dokdo would strain South Korea-Japan relations and weaken coordination between the two nations, thereby undermining their trilateral partnership with the US. When Seoul’s cooperation with Tokyo and Washington is constrained, Beijing gains more room to maneuver.
In other words, China is exploiting one of the most sensitive issues in South Korea-Japan relations to nudge Seoul closer to its side against Tokyo at a time of growing geopolitical tension.
And it appears that South Korea took the bait.
Beijing’s messaging has found allies among some South Koreans who remain sensitive to Japan’s colonial rule and cautious about Japan’s evolving security posture. These voices argue that Takaichi’s comments regarding Taiwan represent an effort to “rearm” Japan.
For instance, state-run Chinese media outlet CGTN released an interview on Tuesday last week with Oh Seung-hee, an assistant professor at South Korea’s Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security, in which she said that she sees “Prime Minister Takaichi’s remarks not as something that came out of nowhere, but as part of Japan’s broader push to strengthen its defense posture, something that has been unfolding since the [former Japanese prime minister Shinzo] Abe Cabinet in 2015.”
“Japan is essentially in the process of dismantling the various self-imposed security constraints it has maintained since 1945. Takaichi’s comments should be understood within this long-running effort to expand and reinforce Japan’s defense capabilities,” Oh said.
This framing draws on deep-seated skepticism in segments of the South Korean public toward Japan’s push toward military normalization, which in turn allows external actors to influence South Korean domestic politics and its relations with Japan.
Yet such joint South Korean-Chinese arguments fail to account for the wider strategic context. Japan’s reassessment of its defense posture is not directed at South Korea; it is aimed at deterring the very power that is now manipulating public sentiment to divide the two democracies.
What is even more concerning is the decision by South Korean President Lee Jae-myung’s administration to standardize the official sequence “Republic of Korea-China-Japan” when referring to the three countries, a shift away from the previous “Republic of Korea-Japan-China.” Placing China ahead of Japan in an official sequence — precisely when Beijing and Tokyo are locked in heightened tension — risks signaling unnecessary distance from Tokyo at a moment when regional unity is most needed.
Seoul appears to believe that softening its alignment with Tokyo would help stabilize relations with Beijing, but this view misreads what China is actually after. Beijing has no interest in maintaining an even-handed or mutually respectful relationship with Seoul; it wants influence and submission, as demonstrated by its draconian economic retaliation against South Korea during the 2016 controversy over the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system — mirroring the pressure it is now applying to Japan. And whenever South Korea and Japan fall into another dispute, Beijing gets more room to maneuver. It is precisely for this reason that Seoul and Tokyo should avoid reverting to past habits of rivalry.
East Asia’s democracies — Taiwan included — are entering a more uncertain, realpolitik-driven period. In this climate, a free and open Indo-Pacific region and Taiwan’s future would depend on whether these democracies can truly work together. Beijing will keep looking for openings to push them apart, and to divide and rule, and it gains the most when democracies stumble into division on their own.
Alan Jeong is a student at Georgetown University in Washington.
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