Recent remarks by Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi — asserting that “a Taiwan contingency is a Japan contingency” — have intensified tensions in East Asia.
China’s strong diplomatic protest, combined with uncertainty surrounding Washington’s long-term Taiwan policy, has reshaped the strategic environment of the Taiwan Strait. These developments underscore that Taiwan’s security rests within a complex strategic triangle involving the Republic of China (ROC), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and the US, with Japan emerging as an increasingly consequential external actor.
A useful way to make sense of this shifting environment is to analyze cross-strait relations through the framework of small and large triangular games. The small triangle focuses on interactions among the ROC government, Taiwan’s domestic political forces and the PRC. The large triangle incorporates US strategic commitments — commitments that are now influenced by Japan’s more explicit security posture.
Despite changing diplomatic signals, national defense remains the core of strategic stability. Facing persistent military pressure from China, Taiwan must reinforce its deterrence while preserving public confidence. Excessive reliance on US security guarantees might reduce short-term conflict risks, but could undermine Taiwan’s long-term strategic autonomy.
A resilient defense structure — integrating force deployment, early-warning capabilities and civil-military coordination — sends credible signals to domestic and international audiences. Stronger defense capacity raises the cost of coercion and enhances Taiwan’s leverage in broader strategic interactions.
Takaichi’s statement reflects a more explicit alignment between Taiwan’s security and Japan’s national interests. Beijing interprets this alignment as part of a containment effort, triggering more forceful diplomatic responses. Meanwhile, Washington continues to stress deterrence, but the consistency of its long-term commitments remains subject to domestic politics and shifting global priorities.
Taiwan must navigate this multilayered strategic environment. In the small triangular game, careful management of cross-strait signals is necessary to avoid unintentional escalation. In the larger strategic game, Taiwan should make use of multilateral platforms, expand cooperation with democratic partners, and maintain flexibility amid evolving US and Japanese policies. Diplomatic diversification, rather than reliance on any single patron, can bolster Taiwan’s strategic resilience.
Taiwan’s economy is deeply embedded in global supply chains, especially in advanced manufacturing and semiconductors. Any geopolitical friction — whether driven by cross-strait tensions, US-China technological rivalry or Japan’s shifting posture — could disrupt production stability, export performance and investment flows.
China may employ economic leverage to shape Taiwan’s political choices. In contrast, the US and Japan seek to reinforce Taiwan’s bargaining position through technological collaboration, market openness and foreign investment.
Taiwan must balance attracting foreign partners with maintaining autonomy in critical technological sectors. Industrial resilience supports national defense and diplomatic flexibility.
Security is not solely the product of military capability and diplomacy; social trust is equally vital. When citizens trust government policies, crisis management becomes more effective and deterrence more credible. Conversely, fragmented public opinion or declining confidence weakens defense readiness and diplomatic maneuvering.
Enhancing transparency in security policy, ensuring clear communication and encouraging public participation are essential for building internal cohesion — an indispensable asset in long-term strategic competition.
The Taiwan Strait is shaped by a complex combination of military pressures, diplomatic maneuvering, economic interdependence and social dynamics. As Japan takes a more proactive stance and US-China rivalry intensifies, Taiwan must operate within an expanded and increasingly unpredictable strategic equation.
To safeguard stability, Taiwan should bolster its autonomous defense capabilities, employ diplomacy with strategic flexibility, enhance industrial resilience, and fortify social trust and internal unity.
Only by balancing these dimensions can Taiwan navigate the evolving triangular — now increasingly quadrilateral — geopolitical landscape, protect national security and sustain long-term socioeconomic development.
Leonard Fong-sheng Wang is an honorary chair professor at the National University of Kaohsiung.
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