If we view former president Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) and former minister of culture Lung Ying-tai (龍應台) within the context of the “Chinese refugee generation,” their words and actions become much easier to understand.
Ma belongs to the first generation of Chinese refugees. His parents fled to Taiwan during the Chinese Civil War, and brought the phantom of the Republic of China (ROC) with them. From a young age, he was indoctrinated with narratives of the “Chinese Dream,” fighting communism and rebuilding “the nation.”
This generation harbors a mix of love and fear toward the Chinese Communist Party (CCP): On one hand, they resent the CCP for seizing their “homeland on the mainland,” yet on the other, they continually seek to justify their own identity through appeals to “national unity” and a cause.
Drawn in by its rhetoric on national identity, their attitude toward the CCP has shifted over time from hostile to sympathetic.
Lung is a second-generation immigrant — she did not personally experience flight and displacement, yet was deeply shaped by her parents’ “refugee complex.”
This group enjoys the benefits of freedom and democracy while living in Taiwan, while nurturing a romanticized notion of “Chinese culture.”
They lean toward a reconciliatory approach to cross-strait relations, believing that communication, understanding and cultural ties can dissipate antagonism and achieve peace. Lung’s discourse on “pushing for peace” and “resilience to engage with the other side” is a reflection of this.
Whether it is Ma’s subservience or Lung’s fantasies, they overlook a core reality of the cross-strait situation.
Communist China is neither an ordinary nation state nor a rational partner that can be persuaded through cultural exchange or good-faith dialogue. Rather, it is a totalitarian system that places authoritarian stability above all.
There are certainly differences between the Ma and Lung positions, with the former leaning toward political attachment and the latter toward cultural illusion. However, they are both expressions of a shared inability among the “refugee generation” to escape China’s shadow. Neither is capable of meeting the current moment in Taiwan. On the contrary, they are doing real harm.
It is regrettable that more than 90 percent of the first and second generations of Chinese refugees display a tendency toward sympathizing with the CCP, if not throwing their lot in with it entirely. It not only shows a lack of gratitude to Taiwan, but also poses a real threat to its survival.
Chang Che-ting is an assistant professor at National United University’s Department of Chinese Language and Literature.
Translated by Gilda Knox Streader
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