On Oct. 8, 1998, then-South Korean president Kim Dae-jung and then-Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi signed the Japan-Republic of Korea Joint Declaration: A New Japan-Republic of Korea Partnership Towards the Twenty-First Century during Kim’s state visit to Japan.
Twenty-seven years on, it is clear that the declaration not only significantly reshaped South Korea-Japan relations, but also improved the regional strategic environment for Taiwan.
The declaration was unprecedented. For the first time, a Japanese prime minister formally documented in a written joint statement “deep remorse and heartfelt apology” for Japan’s colonial rule in Korea in the late 19th and early 20th centuries.
Obuchi approached relations with South Korea through a democratic lens, expressing admiration for its democratization, and anchoring their partnership in universal values such as freedom and democracy.
Kim’s approach to Japan was deeply personal. His years of exile there during South Korea’s military rule had fostered lasting bonds with Japanese supporters in the public, media and government. Speaking to the Japanese Diet in 1998, Kim expressed gratitude not simply in generalities, but in deeply human terms, for those in Japan who had sheltered him and supported South Korea’s democratic struggle. That was democratic diplomacy grounded in lived experience.
The implications extended far beyond Seoul and Tokyo. Just one month later, then-Chinese president Jiang Zemin (江澤民) visited Japan, pressing for an apology from Japan similar to what South Korea had received. Obuchi rejected Jiang’s request. The episode further strained China-Japan relations, especially after Jiang expressed his dissatisfaction directly to then-Japanese emperor Akihito at a state banquet — a gesture that soured Japanese public opinion. Where South Korea was welcomed, China faced rebuke.
This mattered for Taiwan. By affirming its special ties with a newly democratic South Korea, Japan became less inclined to yield to Beijing’s demands — including those regarding Taiwan — especially as bilateral relations were strained by Jiang’s controversial visit, in contrast to Kim’s success a month earlier.
During Jiang’s visit, Tokyo declined to endorse the “three no’s” policy — then-US president Bill Clinton’s 1998 pledge that the US would not support Taiwanese independence, “two Chinas” or Taiwan’s entry into organizations requiring statehood.
The Seoul-Tokyo reconciliation thus opened diplomatic space for Taiwan at a time when cross-Strait tensions remained raw after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1995 and 1996.
The significance goes beyond bilateral ties. The reconciliation between Seoul and Tokyo points to the potential of a democratic triangle among Taiwan, South Korea and Japan — a partnership that could strengthen democratic Northeast Asia.
When these democracies build trust, they not only stabilize the region, but also help to expand Taiwan’s space amid great power competition.
As the 27th anniversary of the 1998 declaration is today, how Taiwan’s democratic neighbors choose to work together would shape not only their own future, but that of democratic Northeast Asia and Taiwan’s place within it.
Alan Jeong is a student at Georgetown University in Washington.
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