The election campaign for the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) chair is heating up, with only 10 days left before party members cast their ballots on Oct. 18. The campaign has revealed potential strengths for the party going into important elections next year and in 2028, particularly the desire among leading candidates to deepen cooperation with the Taiwan People’s Party (TPP). However, it has also exposed the party’s persistent weaknesses, especially in formulating a policy on cross-strait relations that can appeal to the majority of Taiwanese.
Six candidates are registered: former Taipei mayor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), 73; former legislator Cheng Li-wun (鄭麗文), 56; Legislator Lo Chih-chiang (羅智強), 55; Sun Yat-sen School president Chang Ya-chung (張亞中), 71; former Changhua County commissioner Cho Po-yuan (卓伯源), 60; and legal academic Tsai Chih-hong (蔡志弘), 71. Among them, Hau — seen as an experienced, authoritative figure with broad appeal — and Cheng and Lo, regarded as representing the younger generation, have drawn the most attention. Chang, given his “deep blue” positions, is adding an extra dimension to the campaign by forcing the other candidates to engage with his hardline positions without alienating the KMT’s conservative voter base.
Party reform and the question of generational change have been important themes in the campaign. However, observers have noted that while every candidate has highlighted “reform” in their platform, most proposals are little more than procedural tinkering, avoiding the harder questions of factional patronage, reliance on local networks and how the KMT can become more appealing to mainstream society.
Nonetheless, a potential strength for the party is the agreement among leading candidates on the need to deepen cooperation with the TPP to defeat the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which points to widespread KMT recognition that it would struggle to win majority support alone. Lo has proposed detailed polling mechanisms to decide joint candidacies, while Cheng has called for institutionalizing the “blue-white” alliance and formally adopting a common rulebook. While questions remain over how far the TPP would be willing to integrate, the prospect of a deeper KMT-TPP alliance means the DPP could face tougher political contests next year and beyond.
However, the campaign has also highlighted the party’s persistent weakness: its inability to address the wide gap between public perceptions of China and the KMT’s own outlook. The candidates have largely ignored Beijing’s intensifying campaign of “hybrid warfare” and military pressure in the Taiwan Strait. Amid China’s growing military threats, they have offered little on strengthening ties with democratic partners and remain wedded to the widely questioned belief that Beijing can be deterred through exchanges alone.
Each leading candidate has presented themself not as a presidential candidate in their own right, but as a “kingmaker” for the party’s next nominee, with Taichung Mayor Lu Shiow-yen (盧秀燕) widely regarded as the strongest hopeful. She declined to run for chair — citing a desire to focus on governance challenges in Taichung — but the more likely reason is that no serious national politician can afford to stake out positions on China in an internal KMT contest without jeopardizing their broader electability.
This has left the chair election as a battle among ideologues, competing over “one China” identity and ideological purity that is increasingly detached from mainstream public opinion.
The KMT appears stuck in a circular logic: a genuine reformer with presidential ambitions cannot win the chair without adopting positions that alienate mainstream voters, while only a hardline candidate can prevail internally, ensuring the party is unlikely to reform and broaden its appeal. Whether the next chair can break this cycle of contradictions remains to be seen.
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