China is expanding its defense networks in Southeast Asia, risking carving the region into rival camps: one aligned with Beijing, the other friendly to Washington. Left unchecked, the Chinese — and by extension, Russian — presence would become even more deeply embedded, setting the stage for a dangerous new round of superpower competition in the Indo-Pacific region.
These findings, outlined in the Sydney-based Lowy Institute’s latest report, come as Chinese President Xi Jinping (習近平) is forging ever stronger international partnerships. Last weekend, he welcomed Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Tianjin, China, for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization summit. Xi and Modi pledged deeper cooperation in the face of the US trade war, and Modi announced the resumption of direct flights between the two countries. Xi said relations would flourish if they remained partners rather than rivals.
On Wednesday, Xi hosted the Russian president again, along with North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, at a parade to mark the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II.
Illustration: Tania Chou
These moves highlight a subtle, but significant shift in power in the region that is challenging for Washington. To avoid a further erosion of influence, the US and nations like Australia, India, Japan and South Korea must strengthen their alliances. However, these relationships are under pressure as the White House recalibrates its global defense strategy.
For decades, Southeast Asia has managed a delicate dance between the superpowers. Security guarantees came from the US, while China has grown to be the most important economic partner. That is not changing yet — but Beijing is closing the gap.
Washington is still the most influential player, the Lowy report said.
The US is a treaty ally of the Philippines and Thailand, and a close strategic partner to Singapore. It also has the largest number of agreements, dialogues and combined military exercises with countries in the region, according to the report.
Beijing ranks eighth — but is systematically stepping up diplomacy through joint exercises, weapons sales, and military training programs. It has found most success in mainland Southeast Asia, becoming a key security collaborator for Cambodia and Laos.
For governments that sometimes bristle at Western lectures on democracy and human rights, China’s non-interference approach is a welcome change. Investment through its ambitious infrastructure program, the Belt and Road Initiative, has also boosted ties.
Moscow, although second from bottom on the list, has complemented China’s efforts by supplying arms to Vietnam and Myanmar. Together, they are creating an appealing alternative among the smaller, poorer states.
The risks for the US and the 10-country ASEAN are considerable. ASEAN already suffers from threats to unity, such as Cambodia siding with China against several fellow members on claims over the South China Sea. Increasing fractures make it more challenging for the bloc to mediate crises or maintain credibility.
More worryingly, this trend could mean that the weaker countries could become even more dependent on China for security needs, giving Beijing a larger voice in their domestic politics and hence in the bloc, which has historically been a bedrock of regional and mostly pro-US stability.
US President Donald Trump’s tariff policies and cuts to international aid programs are also hurting confidence. Trips by senior US officials could help, but the messaging is often inconsistent.
US Secretary of State Marco Rubio’s visit to Malaysia in July coincided with many ASEAN members receiving letters from the administration declaring new tariff levels. While he was there, the US Department of State laid off about 1,300 staffers, including the Office of Multilateral Affairs in the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, which helped lead US diplomacy in the region.
All is not lost. Washington still has strong partnerships and should build on them. One solution could come from Australia, India, South Korea and Japan. Since 2017, they have steadily increased defense engagement with Southeast Asian countries. They share concerns about China’s rising dominance and, as trade-dependent economies, want to protect freedom of navigation. Boosting security engagement with the region and each other might avoid over-dependence on any single actor.
Southeast Asia is a vital strategic theater, connecting oceans, economies and great powers. Its future depends on choices being made now. The region has been able to navigate rivalry before — but that balance could easily tip, and with it, the stability of the Indo-Pacific.
Karishma Vaswani is a Bloomberg Opinion columnist covering Asia politics with a special focus on China. Previously, she was the BBC’s lead Asia presenter and worked for the BBC across Asia and South Asia for two decades. This column reflects the personal views of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the editorial board or Bloomberg LP and its owners.
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